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THE NEW MARKET MANIPULATION
Tom C.W. Lin
ABSTRACT
Markets face a new and daunting mode of manipulation. With this new mode
of market manipulation, millions of dollars can vanish in seconds, rogue actors
can halt the trading of billion-dollar companies, and trillion-dollar financial
markets can be distorted with a simple click or a few lines of code. Every investor
and institution is at risk. This is the new precarious reality of our financial
markets.
This Article is about our ominous financial reality, this dangerous new mode
of market manipulation, and the need for pragmatic policies to better address
the rising threats to manipulate our financial markets. To start, the Article offers
an overview about the recent rise and regulation of new financial technology. It
begins with a close examination of The Flash Crash of 2010 and the publication
of Flash Boys by Michael Lewis. Next, the Article surveys the changing
landscape of market manipulation. It identifies traditional manipulation
methods like cornering, front running, and pumping-and-dumping, as well as
new manipulation methods like spoofing, pinging, and mass misinformation. It
explains how new cybernetic market manipulation schemes that leverage
modern technologies like electronic networks, social media, and artificial
intelligence are more harmful than traditional schemes. The Article then
grapples with why this new mode of market manipulation will present critical
challenges for regulators. Finally, it recommends three pragmatic proposals for
combating the new threats of cybernetic market manipulation by improving
intermediary integrity, enhancing financial cybersecurity, and simplifying
investment strategies. Ultimately, this Article provides an original and improved
framework for thinking and acting anew about market regulation, market
operations, and market manipulation.
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INTRODUCTION
Wall Street is an illusion.1 The New York Stock Exchange, the real-time
tickers, the traders, the bankers, the brokers, and the bronze charging bull all
create the image that Wall Street, and its people make up the center of a
transparent, fair, and efficient financial universe. In reality, much of the action
today takes place far below and far away from Wall Street—in machines, data
centers, super computers, and fiber optic cables located in anonymous buildings
on non-descript streets.2 In this new financial reality, billions of dollars can
disappear in minutes, a handful of individuals can fundamentally transform
financial operations, a rogue actor can halt the trading of Fortune 500 companies,
and trillion-dollar financial markets can be manipulated with a simple click or a
few lines of code.3
In the Fall of 2015, the perils of this new financial reality manifested in an
unprecedented Department of Justice announcement of charges against three
individuals who allegedly hacked numerous American banks and businesses,
“perpetrated one of the largest thefts of financial-related data in history,”
engaged in massive dissemination of fraudulent market information, and
orchestrated a global, multi-million dollar stock manipulation scheme.4
1 See, e.g., JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND
DELUSION ON WALL STREET 280–83 (2009); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues:
Securities Regulation in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563, 563 (2005); Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets
Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 625–28 (1995).
2 See SCOTT PATTERSON, DARK POOLS: HIGH-SPEED TRADERS, AI BANDITS, AND THE THREAT TO THE
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 233–78 (2012).
3 See, e.g., Graham Bowley, Lone Sale of $4.1 Billion in Contracts Led to ‘Flash Crash’ in May, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/02/business/02flash.html [https://perma.cc/6W26DDR2]; Matthew Goldstein, S.E.C. Charges Man in Bulgaria in Fake Takeover Offer for Avon, N.Y. TIMES
(June 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/05/business/dealbook/sec-charges-bulgarian-man-in-faketakeover-offer-for-avon.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/A5BM-92FQ]; Michael Lewis, The Wolf Hunters of Wall
Street, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Mar. 31, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/06/magazine/flash-boys-michaellewis.html [https://perma.cc/G42L-R6H8]; Nicole Perlroth, Hackers Using Lingo of Wall St. Breach Health
Care Companies’ Email, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/
technology/hackers-target-biotech-companies.html [https://perma.cc/YS8P-NBZT] .
4 See Press Release, DOJ, Attorney General and Manhattan U.S. Attorney Announce Charges Stemming
from Massive Network Intrusions at U.S. Financial Institutions, U.S. Brokerage Firms, a Major News
Publication, and Other Companies (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/attorney-general-andmanhattan-us-attorney-announce-charges-stemming-massive-network [hereinafter Massive Network Intrusions
Press Release]; see also Indictment, United States v. Shalon, S1 15 Cr. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2015),
http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/file/792506/download; Indictment, United States v. Murgio, 15 Cr. 769
(S.D.N.Y. 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/file/792511/download; Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra
Stevenson, Nine Charged in Insider Trading Case Tied to Hackers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/business/dealbook/insider-trading-sec-hacking-case.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/R7PV-Q74L]; Nicole Hong, Two Accused in J.P. Morgan Hacking Case Plead Not Guilty,
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According to the unsealed indictments, the hackers generated over $100 million
in illicit gains using only their computers to hack into private servers and
manipulate the markets for certain stocks.5 Preet Bharara, then U.S. Attorney for
the Southern District of New York, described their criminal market manipulation
activities as “securities fraud on cyber steroids.”6
This Article is about this new, perilous financial reality, the emerging mode
of new market manipulation, and the need for better pragmatic policies to
address the rising technological threats to manipulate financial markets. This
Article offers an original, early examination of the new high-tech forms of
market distortions that it calls cybernetic market manipulation, explains the
critical consequences of these dangerously disruptive actions on the
marketplace, and proposes sensible policies to better protect investors and
safeguard the financial system.
Building on the author’s previous works on new financial technology, and
drawing upon a growing literature relating to modern financial regulation, this
Article seeks to make three contributions.7 First, it aims to provide a cogent,
WALL ST. J. (June 9, 2016, 5:02 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/two-accused-in-j-p-morgan-hacking-caseplead-not-guilty-1465505356 [https://perma.cc/G877-4LRN].
5 See Indictment, Shalon, S1 15 Cr. 333, at 4; see also Indictment, Murgio, 15 Cr. 769, at 1; Goldstein &
Stevenson, supra note 4.
6 See Portia Crowe, BHARARA: The JPMorgan Hackers Committed ‘Securities Fraud on Cyber Steroids’,
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 10, 2015, 1:27 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/preet-bharara-on-jpmorgan-hackers2015-11 [https://perma.cc/4ATP-98U7].
7 In the years since the Financial Crisis of 2008, the scholarly inquiry into financial innovation and
financial regulation has been a burgeoning field of legal research. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank:
Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779 (2011) (discussing why the DoddFrank Act will have adverse consequences); William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth
Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12–24 (2013) (describing the development of securities regulations and SROs);
John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and
Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019 (2012) (analyzing different theories about why reform
legislation flounders); Jill E. Fisch, Top Cop or Regulatory Flop? The SEC at 75, 95 VA. L. REV. 785 (2009)
(arguing that the SEC lacks “functional effectiveness” when regulating); Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten
& Gabriel V. Rauterberg, The New Stock Market: Sense and Nonsense, 65 DUKE L.J. 191 (2015) (proposing a
new framework for analyzing the stock market using “adverse selection, the principal-agent problem, and a
multivenue trading system”); Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of Financial
Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. REV. 127 (2009) (finding that the
current industry risk models are inadequate and dangers arise from the new financial code); Kathryn Judge,
Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657
(2012) (assessing methods beyond mere disclosure to deal with financial innovation and systemic risk); Charles
R. Korsmo, High-Frequency Trading: A Regulatory Strategy, 48 U. RICH. L. REV. 523 (2014) (considering how
to regulate high-frequency trading post-Flash Crash); Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson,
“Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337 (2013)
(contemplating the meaning of being a public corporation); Adam J. Levitin, The Politics of Financial
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early narrative for understanding and explaining the new financial marketplace.
Second, it aims to highlight the emerging ways that new financial technologies,
electronic communications, and information systems can be leveraged to
manipulate financial markets to unfairly privilege the few to the detriment of the
many. Third, it aims to recommend workable steps that policymakers and
investors should consider to better secure the integrity of the marketplace against
new modes of market manipulation. Undoubtedly, pursuing these objectives in
a rapidly evolving, dynamic marketplace will necessarily result in a dated and
daunting work in progress. Nevertheless, however dated and daunting, such an
endeavor is also a useful and worthy one for it can offer insight about the
profound, unfolding changes in our marketplace and shed light on the future of
financial markets and market manipulation. Ultimately, this Article aspires to
provide an original and effective framework for policymakers to think and act
anew about market regulation, market operations, and market manipulation.
This Article constructs this framework in five parts. Part I provides
background. It examines the Flash Crash of 2010 and the publication of Flash
Boys by Michael Lewis, two seminal events that brought market manipulation
and new financial technology to the forefront of public attention.8 First, it
explores the Flash Crash, an unprecedented market event where a trillion dollars
disappeared from the marketplace in a matter of minutes. It critiques the 2010
joint investigative report of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) on the event, and the
subsequent arrest of a trader in connection with the Flash Crash five years later
in 2015. Second, Part I studies the facts and fallout associated with the
publication of Flash Boys, a book that lifts the veil on the illusion that is
Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991 (2014)
(reviewing the literature relating to the Financial Crisis); Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA.
L. REV. 567 (2014) (explaining the rise of technology on Wall Street and a framework for regulating this new
area); Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-Regulation, 159
U. PA. L. REV. 411 (2011) (contending that more self-regulation could be used in the financial industry); Steven
L. Schwarcz, Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 211 (2009) (comparing
complex financial markets and complex engineering systems); Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and
Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities Markets After the Financial Meltdown, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 323 (2011)
(evaluating intermediary behaviors to understand where regulation would be effective); Charles K. Whitehead,
The Goldilocks Approach: Financial Risk and Staged Regulation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1270 (2012)
(cautioning that regulation should be done in timed stages rather than broad strokes).
8 See generally U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS
REGARDING THE MARKET EVENTS OF MAY 6, 2010 (2010), [hereinafter CFTC & SEC FINDINGS]
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2010/marketevents-report.pdf (detailing government investigation into the
Flash Crash); MICHAEL LEWIS, FLASH BOYS: A WALL STREET REVOLT (2014) (examining the events leading up
to the Flash Crash).
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contemporary Wall Street and reveals the fraught manipulative inner workings
of American capital markets. Through the remarkable tale of an unlikely band
of reformers and their battle against high frequency traders, the book explains
and exposes how new financial technology has created new ways to “rig”
markets.9 Part I establishes a foundation for discussing market manipulation and
the new financial reality.
Building on that foundation, Part II offers wider context. It does so by
connecting the Flash Crash and Flash Boys to the larger sea change occurring in
the financial markets. It explains why the Flash Crash and Flash Boys are truly
about much larger happenings in the financial marketplace. It provides a
descriptive and normative perspective on the rise of new financial technology
and the early regulatory response to it. It analyzes the advances and challenges
of the new financial reality on the integrity of the marketplace with the
emergence of new methods of market manipulation. It inquires into the larger
legal and policy issues surrounding innovation, regulation, and risk in the new
financial marketplace. Part II explains and exposes the unfolding context of our
financial markets and the new mode of market manipulation.
Part III moves from context to action. It explores the evolving methods of
market manipulation given new financial realities. It begins by categorizing
common traditional methods of market manipulation like cornering, squeezing,
front running, pumping-and-dumping, and benchmark distortion. Part III then
identifies emerging high-tech methods of market manipulation like spoofing,
pinging, and mass misinformation. Using recent manipulation schemes
involving hacking, social media, and artificial intelligence as illustrative
examples, it explains why the new high-tech mode of cybernetic market
manipulation that leverages the electronic communications, information
systems, and algorithmic platforms of the modern financial marketplace is more
harmful and impactful than those of its traditional predecessors.10 Part III
identifies and highlights the new problematic means to disrupt, distort, and
manipulate financial markets that damage market value and investor confidence.
Part IV foreshadows regulatory problems. It grapples with why new methods
of cybernetic market manipulation will prove to be so challenging for regulators.
It explains how core matters relating to resources, detection, and enforcement
9

LEWIS, supra note 8, at 34, 79, 89, 226.
See, e.g., Shaun D. Ledgerwood & Paul R. Carpenter, A Framework for the Analysis of Market
Manipulation, 8 REV. L. & ECON. 253, 282–84 (2012) (discussing the various harms caused by market
manipulation).
10
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will likely prevent regulators from effectively addressing new methods of
manipulation in the emerging, high-tech financial marketplace that is
increasingly autonomous, data-driven, and fragmented. Part IV contends with
the interlocking challenges of reform, risk, and reward that accompany financial
innovation and regulation.
Part V turns from problems to solutions. It anticipates the implications
caused by cybernetic market manipulation, and recommends three pragmatic
policies that should be considered to better address the harms caused by the new
modes of cybernetic manipulation in the near term. It argues for improving
intermediary integrity, enhancing financial cybersecurity, and simplifying
investment strategies. Admittedly, these proposals will not cure all of the
emerging manipulative ills posed by the new financial reality. Instead, they offer
sensible solutions that can be implemented in the near term to better safeguard
investors and the marketplace from manipulation while larger issues are being
debated and deliberated. Part V presents an early sketch of new paths forward
for addressing cybernetic market manipulation in the coming years.
Finally, this Article closes with a brief conclusion. It recounts the challenges
inherent in regulating an incredibly dynamic financial marketplace, and echoes
the urgent call for more nuanced and more workable understandings of new
market realities and new market manipulation.
I. THE FLASH CRASH AND FLASH BOYS
Two seminal events in recent history brought the hard truths of new financial
technology and market manipulation to the forefront of general public
consciousness. The first event was the unprecedented trading session of the
American stock market on May 6, 2010, that is now simply known as the Flash
Crash.11 The second event was the publication of Michael Lewis’s book, Flash
Boys, on March 31, 2014.12 Both events establish an early foundation and shed
insightful light for better understanding the evolution of modern markets and
market manipulation.

11

CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 8, at 1.
New Book by Michael Lewis to Pub This Spring, W.W. NORTON & COMPANY, INC. (Jan. 15, 2014),
http://books.wwnorton.com/books/news.aspx?id=4294981077.
12
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A. The Flash Crash
1. The Initial Story
On May 6, 2010, the American stock market, the most valuable and respected
capital market in the world, experienced a trading session of unprecedented
volatility and velocity.13 The trading day opened at 9:30 a.m. (EST) with news
about social unrest in Greece as a response to government actions related to the
country’s debt.14 For the first few hours, the markets moved like they did for
most ordinary trading sessions. Suddenly, around 2:40 p.m., the markets
experienced a sharp decline and volatility that would last for about twenty
minutes.15 In the span of less than thirty very volatile minutes, approximately $1
trillion in market value vanished from the U.S. stock market.16 During this
volatile period, hundreds of securities, including those of blue chip companies,
traded at absurd prices, ranging from a penny per share to $100,000 per share.17
Following the precipitous decline, the market began to rebound rapidly,
recovering the bulk of the losses.18 The volatile trading session of May 6, 2010,
is now simply referred to as the Flash Crash.19
Following the Flash Crash, the SEC and CFTC initiated a joint investigation
and issued a report on September 30, 2010, about their findings.20 According to
the report, the Flash Crash was likely initiated by a futures order from Waddell
& Reed, a Kansas mutual fund company.21 At approximately 2:32 p.m., with a
high-speed, automated computer program, Waddell & Reed created an order to
sell $4.1 billion of E-Mini S&P futures contracts.22 These futures tracked the
movement of the S&P 500 Index (S&P 500), which measures the performance
of America’s 500 largest publicly traded companies.23 Waddell & Reed’s
program executed the order “without regard to price or time,” meaning the
program would automatically continue to sell the contracts even if the price
13

CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 8, at 1.
Id. at 9.
15 Id.
16 Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir. Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., The Race to Zero, Speech at the
International Economic Association Sixteenth World Congress (July 8, 2011), at http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/archive/Documents/historicpubs/speeches/2011/speech509.pdf.
17 CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 8, at 1.
18 Id. at 9.
19 Bowley, supra note 3.
20 See CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 8.
21 Id. at 2; Bowley, supra note 3.
22 CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 8, at 2.
23 Id.
14
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dropped and for however long it took to fulfill the order.24 The entire order was
fulfilled in about twenty minutes.25 In years past, because of technological
limitations, an order of this size would have normally taken several hours or
days to complete.26
A few minutes after the fulfillment of Waddell & Reed’s order, the
computerized trading programs of other market participants executed
corresponding high-speed trades in the futures and equity markets that caused
significant volatility and liquidity issues in the equity and futures markets.27
Within twenty minutes after Waddell & Reed’s initial trade, S&P futures
experienced a 3% drop,28 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average (Dow)
experienced a 9.16% drop, which amounted to nearly 1000 points.29 During the
Dow’s swift free fall, share prices in individual stocks also experienced rapid
declines. Blue-chip stocks like Proctor & Gamble and 3M each suffered losses
nearing or exceeding 20%, or billions of dollars in market capitalization.30
Shares of Accenture, a leading consulting company, plummeted by over 99%,
from $40 to $0.01.31 On the flipside, shares of Sotheby’s, the famed auction
house, increased three thousand-fold, from $34 to $99,999.99.32 At the end of
the unprecedented trading day, the major futures and equity indexes closed with
losses of about 3% relative to the previous day.33
The turbulent last few hours of the trading day on May 6, 2010, resembled a
rollercoaster ride with trillions of dollars at stake. The Wall Street Journal
visually summarized the Flash Crash as follows:34

24

Bowley, supra note 3.
CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 8, at 2.
26 See id.
27 Id. at 3.
28 Id.
29 See David M. Serritella, High Speed Trading Begets High Speed Regulation: SEC Response to Flash
Crash, Rash, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 433, 435.
30 CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 8, at 84–85.
31 Id. at 83; Haldane, supra note 16.
32 Haldane, supra note 16.
33 CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 8, at 1.
34 Matt Phillips, Flash Crash Anniversary: Relive the Thrills and Spills in Charts!, WALL ST. J.:
MARKETBEAT (May 6, 2011, 10:40 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2011/05/06/flash-crash-anniversaryrelive-the-thrills-and-spills-in-charts/ [https://perma.cc/YC2Q-FQVS].
25
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Figure 1: Wall Street Journal Timeline of the May 6, 2010, Flash Crash.

Ultimately, the SEC and CFTC joint inquiry did not blame the Flash Crash
on manipulative conduct or illegal behavior.35 The inquiry also did not blame
the Flash Crash entirely on automated algorithmic trading programs. Instead, the
inquiry’s preliminary conclusion was that such traders and programs played a
critical role in eroding liquidity and exacerbating volatility on the day of the
Flash Crash, but did not cause the “extreme volatility in security prices observed
that day.”36 In addition to their preliminary findings, the SEC and the CFTC also
pledged to better safeguard the integrity and reliability of the marketplace
against “any unintentional or potentially abusive or manipulative conduct” that
may lead to price distortions.37
2. The Trillion-Dollar Man
In April of 2015, nearly five years after the Flash Crash, Navinder Singh
Sarao was arrested at his home outside of London for market manipulation that
allegedly contributed to the trillion-dollar crash.38 Sarao was charged by the
35

CFTC & SEC FINDINGS, supra note 8, at 79.
Id. at 79.
37 Id. at 8.
38 See Futures Trader Charged with Illegally Manipulating Stock Market, Contributing to the May 2010
Market ‘Flash Crash’, DOJ (Apr. 21, 2015) [hereinafter Futures Trader], http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
futures-trader-charged-illegally-manipulating-stock-market-contributing-may-2010-market-flash; see also John
36
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Department of Justice (DOJ) for criminal violations as well as by the CFTC for
civil violations.39
The complaints by the DOJ and the CFTC detailed that Sarao was being
charged with “one count of wire fraud, ten counts of commodities fraud, ten
counts of commodities manipulation, and one count of ‘spoofing,’ a practice of
bidding or offering with the intent to cancel the bid or offer before execution.”40
According to unsealed court documents, Sarao allegedly designed and used
algorithmic computer programs to manipulate the futures contracts tied to the
S&P 500 Index.41 Specifically, he allegedly manipulated the market for E-Mini
S&P 500 futures contracts being traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.42
He allegedly did so by flooding the market with large volumes of fraudulent
trade orders that distorted the price of the E-Mini futures to his advantage.43
According to the DOJ, Sarao manipulated futures contracts tied to the S&P 500
over the course of many years, including in the days and hours leading up to the
Flash Crash, which netted him $40 million in ill-gotten gains.44
In November of 2016, after fighting extradition to the United States for over
a year, Sarao pleaded guilty to wire fraud and spoofing.45
The case of Sarao led to much disquiet and many questions in the
marketplace.46 How does one reconcile the arrest of Sarao with the initial
Detrixhe & Suzi Ring, Study Says Sarao May Not Have Been Responsible for Flash Crash, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
27, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-27/hound-of-hounslow-s-flash-crash-blamequestioned-before-hearing [https://perma.cc/BR55-ZWLH].
39 See Ex Parte Motion, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-3398, 2015 WL 2456322 (N.D.
Ill. Apr. 17, 2015); see also Consent Order, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-3398, 2016 WL
8257513 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 14, 2016); Complaint, CFTC v. Nav Sarao Futures Ltd. PLC, No. 15-cv-3398, 2015
WL 1843321 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2015).
40 Futures Trader, supra note 38.
41 See Complaint, Sarao, No. 15-cv-3398, 2015 WL 1843321.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Aruna Viswanatha, ‘Flash Crash’ Trader Navinder Sarao Pleads Guilty to Spoofing, WALL ST. J. (Nov.
10, 2016, 10:26 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/flash-crash-trader-navinder-sarao-pleads-guilty-to-spoofing1478733934 [https://perma.cc/A9TH-LVW4].
46 See, e.g., Tim Cave, Juliet Samuel & Aruna Viswanatha, U.K. ‘Flash Crash’ Trader Navinder Sarao
Fighting Extradition to U.S. Granted Bail, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 22, 2015, 7:28 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/u-k-trader-navinder-sarao-vows-to-fight-u-s-extradition-plans-1429705635 [https://perma.cc/CRG39GCX]; Julia La Roche, Wall Street Can’t Stop Talking About the ‘Ridiculous’ Arrest of the ‘Flash Crash’
Trader, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 25, 2015, 2:40 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/arrest-of-nav-sarao-isridiculous-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/3EP4-YHVT]; Douwe Miedema & Ann Saphir, Delayed Flash Crash
Arrest May Herald Future Spoofing Detection Woes, REUTERS (Apr. 23, 2015, 7:12 PM), http://uk.reuters.
com/article/2015/04/23/us-flashcrash-trader-cme-idUKKBN0NE0I220150423
[https://perma.cc/5UT9-

LIN GALLEYPROOFS3

1264

6/19/2017 12:01 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1253

findings of the SEC and CFTC? How can one man working from his house
manipulate the multi-trillion dollar American financial market? Why did it take
regulators five years to find and arrest him? How stable and safe are financial
markets, if one trader with relatively little capital and technological capacity can
cause such deleterious effects? While the answers to these and other questions
remain open, regulators have taken a number of steps to better safeguard the
stability and integrity of the marketplace against nefarious attempts to
manipulate it in the years since the Flash Crash.47 While another crash matching
the velocity and magnitude of the Flash Crash has yet to materialize, there have
been many smaller, more isolated episodes of market volatility and disruption.48
Nevertheless, some experts and policymakers speculate that as markets become
more technologically dependent, it will only be a matter of time before another
major crash like the Flash Crash occurs again.49
2ENW]; Nathaniel Popper & Jenny Anderson, Trader Arrested in Manipulation That Contributed to 2010 ‘Flash
Crash’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/business/dealbook/trader-in-britainarrested-on-charges-of-manipulation-that-led-to-2010-flash-crash.html [https://perma.cc/9BJL-GPHT]; James
Surowiecki, New Ways to Crash the Market, NEW YORKER (May 18, 2015), http://www.
newyorker.com/magazine/2015/05/18/new-ways-to-crash-the-market [https://perma.cc/4FSP-9KWN].
47 For a discussion of the post-Flash Crash regulatory actions, see infra Part II.B.
48 See Graham Bowley, The Flash Crash, in Miniature, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/09/business/09flash.html [https://perma.cc/T5GH-APB7] (reporting on the
occurrence of smaller flash crashes); Jacob Bunge, Justin Baer & Kaitlyn Kiernan, Goldman Issues Mistaken
Options Orders, Roiling Prices, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2013, 10:26 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324747104579024964124614096 [https://perma.cc/LC9L-S8RD]; Amy Chozick & Nicole
Perlroth, Twitter Speaks, Markets Listen and Fears Rise, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/29/business/media/social-medias-effects-on-markets-concern-regulators.
html [https://perma.cc/K8U7-7UU2] (describing the stock market crash caused by a false tweet); Shen Hong,
Everbright Securities Fiasco Casts a Shadow: Chinese Brokerage Leads Losses in Sector with 10% Decline,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2013, 12:36 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014241278873236085045
79024360736416276 [https://perma.cc/E2EB-DVZL]; Edward E. Kaufman, Jr. & Carl M. Levin, Preventing the
Next Flash Crash, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/opinion/
06kaufman.html [https://perma.cc/F77B-HZVG] (discussing mini-crashes since the Flash Crash); Matt Krantz,
Mini Flash Crashes Worry Traders, USA TODAY (May 17, 2011, 11:52 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/
money/markets/2011-05-16-mini-flash-crashes-market-worry_n.htm [https://perma.cc/V87G-GX7A]; Annie
Massa, Headaches Set In for Traders with NYSE Glitch Near Market Close, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2017, 10:56
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-20/headaches-set-in-for-traders-with-nyse-glitchnear-market-close [https://perma.cc/JD8K-QEZH]; Nathaniel Popper, Flood of Errant Trades Is a Black Eye for
Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/02/business/unusual-volume-roilsearly-trading-in-some-stocks.html [https://perma.cc/WA7S-P2T4] (discussing market instability caused by
computerized trading relating to Facebook’s initial public offering and a rogue computer program related to
Knight Trading); Nathaniel Popper, Stock Market Flaws Not So Rare, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/29/business/mishap-at-bats-stock-exchange-is-indicative-of-market.html
[https://perma.cc/4GJ6-KCAF] (reporting on the volatility surrounding the initial public offering of BATS
Global Markets, an electronic stock exchange pioneer).
49 See Kaufman & Levin, supra note 48 (“[A]lgorithmic trading has caused mini-flash crashes since, and
surveys suggest that most investors and analysts believe it’s only a matter of time before the Big One.”).
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B. Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt
In addition to the Flash Crash, the other seminal event in recent history that
brought market manipulation and new financial technology to the forefront of
public attention was the publication of Michael Lewis’s Flash Boys. Published
four years after the Flash Crash, Flash Boys tells the story of the advance and
menace of high frequency trading on Wall Street, and the efforts of a small group
of men to challenge it. The book, with its villains, heroes, and a compelling
setting with billions of dollars at stake, grounds much of the recent and ongoing,
high-level discussion about market manipulation and market reform.
1. The Setting
Flash Boys takes place in present-day Wall Street, a marketplace that is
undergoing a fundamental shift. The book asserts that our popular conceptions
about Wall Street and how the marketplace works are antiquated and wrong.50
There is a popular perception that the stock market is a transparent and fair
human endeavor.51 Men and women in crowded pits at august buildings like the
New York Stock Exchange in downtown Manhattan take and execute trades on
behalf of clients. Television channels like CNBC and Bloomberg broadcast live
those images with real-time ticker scrolls indicating changes in stock price and
volume. Generally, the marketplace is believed to be transparent, fair, and well
regulated by agencies like the SEC.52
As chronicled by Lewis, the reality of the modern marketplace is quite
different from the popular perception. It is less human, less transparent, and less
fair than it is in the popular imagination of the public.53 First, instead of humans,
automated machines communicating through high-speed spectra and cables
operate much of the marketplace.54 In fact, in the United States today, powerful
supercomputers running high-frequency algorithmic programs, devoid of human

50

LEWIS, supra note 8, at 3.
Id. at 9, 40.
52 See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV.
777, 840–42 (2000) (discussing how the SEC promotes the idea of a fair, well-regulated stock market).
53 LEWIS, supra note 8, at 9–10, 40.
54 See generally DAVID J. LEINWEBER, NERDS ON WALL STREET: MATH, MACHINES, AND WIRED MARKETS
31–64 (2009) (discussing past impact of technology in the marketplace and predicting use of future technology);
PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 233–78; Felix Salmon & Jon Stokes, Bull vs. Bear vs. Bot, WIRED (Jan. 1, 2011),
https://www.questia.com/magazine/1P3-2268084801/bull-vs-bear-vs-bot [https://perma.cc/5P9V-J72K] (“It’s
the machines’ market now; we just trade in it.”).
51
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assistance, conduct most equity trading.55 Second, instead of one transparent
stock market, much of the trading in today’s market occurs in multiple dark
pools and private exchanges that lack the light and transparency of public
exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ.56 A dark pool
refers to a private, electronic trading forum that is not subject to the same type
of regulation and scrutiny as the public stock exchanges.57 According to Lewis,
“[i]nside a dark pool, no one but the broker who ran it had any idea what was
happening.”58 And, third, instead of being a fair, level playing field, Lewis
argues that the market is “rigged” to the benefit of wealthy, high-speed traders
and to the detriment of everyone else in the marketplace.59 The truth of the matter
is that in a marketplace moving at velocities measured in milliseconds, ordinary
investors simply cannot compete with high-frequency traders—and their super
powerful and speedy algorithms—even if they all receive actionable information
at the same time.
In sum, a rapidly evolving modern marketplace for equity trading serves as
the setting for the book’s protagonists and antagonists in their contest for profit
and principle.
2. The Villains
The villains of the book were unscrupulous high-frequency traders who used
speed to unfairly manipulate the marketplace. Lewis argued that high-frequency
traders used their superior speeds and connections to front run orders and route
trades to dark pools unfavorable to many counterparties.60
High-frequency firms, therefore, gain an advantage in the marketplace by
purchasing superior speed and connections. Through the process of co-location,
high-frequency firms would purchase or lease real estate as close as possible to
the servers and data centers of the exchanges.61 This allows their high-speed
55 See Graham Bowley, Fast Traders, in Spotlight, Battle Rules, N.Y. TIMES (July 17, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/business/fast-traders-under-attack-defend-work.html [https://perma.cc/
YV7C-2WFZ] (estimating that 60% of all equity trading consist of high-frequency trading).
56 See LEWIS, supra note 8, at 42; Matthew Philips, Where Has All the Stock Trading Gone?, BLOOMBERG
(May 10, 2012, 10:20 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-05-10/where-has-all-the-stocktrading-gone [https://perma.cc/BYW5-AM3X].
57 See BRIAN R. BROWN, CHASING THE SAME SIGNALS: HOW BLACK-BOX TRADING INFLUENCES STOCK
MARKETS FROM WALL STREET TO SHANGHAI 116 (2010).
58 LEWIS, supra note 8, at 43.
59 See id. at 34, 79, 89, 226.
60 Id. at 70–84.
61 Id. at 79.
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machines to reduce the time it takes to execute a trade by fractions of a second.62
Since speed is so important in the machine-driven modern marketplace, any time
difference, however small, confers a huge advantage to the faster party.
In addition to co-location, high-frequency firms also have superior
connections to exchanges and dark pools via special access to high-speed cables
and order feeds.63 This special access allowed such firms to maintain their
advantage in velocity, and the access to the order feeds conferred an
informational advantage to the firms over other market participants. Together,
the edge in speed and information tilted the playing field to the advantage of
high-frequency firms. First, because high-frequency firms were permitted to see
the order flows coming into a dark pool or exchange, they could use their
superior speed to jump ahead of your order in that exchange and other
exchanges.64 Then, they would buy the stock you wanted to buy and sell it right
back to you at a premium.65 Lewis likened this predatory practice to front
running that exacted a tax on the entire marketplace, amounting to $160 million
a day.66 Second, because of their superior speed, high-frequency firms were able
to manipulate the marketplace by submitting and canceling millions of trades
daily as a means to discern the intentions of other investors.67 These firms
accounted for half of the trades in the stock market, yet they submitted over 99%
of the orders.68 Third, with their superior speed and technology, high-frequency
firms could manipulatively route and re-route customer orders to forums that
were more advantageous to the firms themselves relative to their customers.69
According to the book, high-frequency firms had rigged the entire American
stock market to their benefit, so that they would always win and everyone else
would lose (a little or a lot).70 In his telling, “[w]hat had once been the world’s

62

Id.
See id. at 51–55, 180–85; see also Order Instituting Administrative and Cease-and-Desist Proceedings,
In re New York Stock Exchange LLC, Exchange Act Release No. 67857 (Sept. 14, 2012) (discussing the various
propriety informational feeds of the New York Stock Exchange); Scott Patterson, Speed Traders Get an Edge,
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 6, 2014, 8:49 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023044509045793670509
46606562 [https://perma.cc/GTP7-77E4].
64 LEWIS, supra note 8, at 180–85.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 52.
67 Id. at 171.
68 See id. (“[T]hough they made only half of all trades in the U.S. stock market, they submitted more than
99 percent of the orders.”).
69 Id. at 111.
70 Id. at 180–85.
63
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most public, most democratic, financial market had become, in spirit, something
more like a private viewing of a stolen work of art.”71
3. The Heroes
If high frequency traders are the villains of the story, then the heroes were an
unlikely group of misfits led by a Canadian banker named Brad Katsuyama. The
book chronicles how this group of men uncovered the manipulative
mechanizations of high-frequency traders, and how they sought to upend the
unfairness in the marketplace.
Katsuyama was a trader at the Royal Bank of Canada, a Canadian investment
bank not thought to be a premier institution in the world of high finance.72
Around 2007, Katsuyama began to see that his stock orders could not be
completed at their requested volume and price specifications. For example, an
order for 10,000 shares of Intel at $22 a share, which appeared to be available
on the market, would promptly disappear the moment he entered his trade.73 It
was as if the marketplace knew his desires before he declared them. Katsuyama
decided to investigate, and discovered that other sophisticated traders on Wall
Street were facing the same issue.
Along with his colleagues, Rob Park and Ronan Ryan, two unlikely Wall
Street characters, Katsuyama decided to burrow further into the inner-workings
of the U.S. stock market in order to gain a better understanding. Through careful
trial and error, Katsuyama, Park, and Ryan discovered that an infinitesimally
small measure of time—microseconds or millionths of a second—was at the
crux of their trading issues.74 They discovered that high-frequency trading firms
were buying advantages in speed and access to manipulate the playing field in
their favor. These firms did so via special access to co-located servers, highspeed cable lines, and customer order flows, which gave them more information
and better execution times than everyone else in the marketplace.75 It essentially
meant that high-frequency firms could always have better, actionable
information than other investors, and they could always execute their trades
faster than other investors. It was akin to a patron at a restaurant seeing that you
ordered a $10 burger with your waiter, running ahead of your waiter with their
71
72
73
74
75

Id. at 69.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 60–64.
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strategically placed speedy, automated waiter, and buying all the $10 burgers so
that you cannot complete your desired order unless you buy one at a premium.
Upon uncovering this disturbing discovery, Katsuyama sought to challenge
the high-frequency firms. Counterintuitively, rather than trying to gain more
speed in trading, Katsuyama and his team decided to reduce the speed of their
trades. They built a program called Thor that would delay their order
transmissions so that their orders would hit the servers of the various exchanges
simultaneously.76 By slowing their orders this way, it ensured that highfrequency firms could not see their order on one exchange and beat them to
completing that order on another exchange using their superior speeds.77 Thor
was an effective countermeasure to the predatory practices of high-frequency
traders, but its impact was limited in a modern marketplace dominated by high
frequency trading.
To enhance their impact, Katsuyama and his team decided to leave their
comfortable and lucrative jobs to start their own exchange, the Investors
Exchange, or IEX.78 IEX would not permit co-location, special data access, or
rebates for orders, and it would charge one rate for all buyers and sellers.79 IEX
was designed to treat all investors equally and safeguard investors from the
predatory practices of high-frequency traders.
4. The Fallout
While others have previously written about high frequency trading and
market manipulation,80 none have generated the publicity and policy impact of
Flash Boys.81 Following its publication, private litigants, the New York Attorney
General, the DOJ, the U.S. Senate, and the SEC all announced initiatives and

76

Id. at 50.
Id. at 49.
78 Id. at 164.
79 Id. at 173–77.
80 See SAL ARNUK & JOSEPH SALUZZI, BROKEN MARKETS: HOW HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND
PREDATORY PRACTICES ON WALL STREET ARE DESTROYING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND YOUR PORTFOLIO 68–
78 (2012); PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 233–78.
81 The New York Times Best Sellers, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/books/bestsellers/2014/05/11/ [https://perma.cc/UDF6-UTFF]. The book, like many of Lewis’s previous books, became a
national bestseller. About the Author, MICHAEL LEWIS, http://michaellewiswrites.com/index.html#top (last
visited Mar. 30, 2017); see also MICHAEL LEWIS, LIAR’S POKER: RISING THROUGH THE WRECKAGE ON WALL
STREET (1989); MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME (2003); MICHAEL
LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010); MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BLIND SIDE:
EVOLUTION OF A GAME (2006).
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actions to look into trading practices in the U.S. stock market.82 Despite its
publicity and policy impact, Flash Boys was not without its critics. Many
observers inside and outside the financial industry thought that Flash Boys
oversimplified the modern marketplace and unfairly vilified high-frequency
traders.83 The debate between the book’s critics and its admirers is a legitimate
debate about the book itself, but it is also part of a larger debate about the inner
workings of the emerging, new financial reality.
II. THE NEW FINANCIAL REALITY
The Flash Crash and Flash Boys serve as two flashpoints in recent history
about a larger sea change occurring in our financial markets. Innovations and
advances in financial technology have brought forth a new financial reality for
market participants and regulators alike. The new methods of market
manipulation alluded to in the Flash Crash and Flash Boys can be best
understood in a wider context of the larger legal and policy issues surrounding
innovation, governance, and operations of the new financial marketplace and the
early regulatory responses to it.
A. The New Marketplace
The Flash Crash and Flash Boys are part of a larger story about the rise of
artificial intelligence, automation, and other forms of advanced technology used
in finance. Underappreciated in the discussions surrounding the Flash Crash and
Flash Boys is the fact that smart, autonomous high-speed machines running on
algorithmic programs have gradually taken over many aspects of the financial
industry beyond equity trading in our financial markets.84 While the fallout of
82 See, e.g., High Frequency Trading’s Impact on the Economy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec.,
Ins., and Inv. of the H. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. 3 (2014) [hereinafter
Hearings]; Michael Mackenzie, Kara Scannell & Nicole Bullock, Share Trades: Murky Pools, FIN. TIMES (June
27, 2014, 6:42 PM), https://www.ft.com/content/a22603c4-fde1-11e3-acf8-00144feab7de [https://perma.
cc/AH53-T4RG]; Scott Patterson & Jenny Strasburg, High-Speed Trading Firms Face New U.S. Scrutiny, WALL
ST. J. (Mar. 18, 2014, 8:27 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023032878045794476106255
54506 [https://perma.cc/DY2W-6FSB]; Mary Jo White, Chair, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Sandler
O’Neill & Partners, L.P. Global Exchange and Brokerage Conference: Enhancing Our Equity Market Structure
(June 5, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542004312#.U_Ju28ZP8pF.
83 See, e.g., Michael J. de la Merced & William Alden, Scrutiny for Wall Street’s Warp Speed, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 2014, 9:30 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/03/31/scrutiny-for-wall-streets-warp-speed/?
[https://perma.cc/X6E7-AHB8] (quoting several critics of the book); Hearings, supra note 82 (statement of Hal
S. Scott, Director, Comm. on Capital Markets Regulation).
84 See Tom C.W. Lin, National Pastime(s), 55 B.C. L. REV. 1197, 1207–09 (2014) (discussing the rise of
smart machines in the financial industry); Salmon & Stokes, supra note 54 (“Algorithms have become so
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the Flash Crash and Flash Boys has centered on the vices of new financial
technology in terms of high-frequency and algorithmic trading programs, the
larger, still-unfolding context of the new financial reality offers a more balanced
and complicated picture of the ongoing transformation in the financial industry.
Over the last two decades, advances in information technology and financial
regulation have led to a transformational shift in the nature and operations of the
financial industry.85 Human effort and human analysis have gradually been
supplanted by computerized automation and artificial intelligence, creating an
industry where the machines have become just as important as the humans.86
This transformation has essentially changed modern finance into what has been
termed cyborg finance, an industry where machines and humans share
operational influence and power.87
The transformation of modern finance into cyborg finance touches almost
every part of the financial industry.88 While trading has received most of the
attention because of the Flash Crash and Flash Boys, other basic functions of
finance, such as risk analysis and wealth management, have also been
transformed by the rise of autonomous smart machines in the financial
industry.89 Today, practically every significant financial institution uses some
form of advanced artificial intelligence for risk analysis and investment

ingrained in our financial system that the markets could not operate without them.”); Gregory Scopino, Do
Automated Trading Systems Dream of Manipulating the Price of Futures Contracts? Policing Markets for
Improper Trading Practices by Algorithmic Robots, 67 FLA. L. REV. 221, 222–24 (2015) (“Now, almost all parts
of the financial markets, including the markets for futures and other derivatives, are computerized and automated
to some extent, from the exchanges to the traders.”).
85 See, e.g., Robert DeYoung, Safety, Soundness, and the Evolution of the U.S. Banking Industry, 92 FED.
RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., First and Second Quarters 2007, at 41, 42–44; Loretta J. Mester,
Commentary: Some Thoughts on the Evolution of the Banking System and the Process of Financial
Intermediation, 92 FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV., First and Second Quarters 2007, at 67, 67–72;
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition,
Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215.
86 See, e.g., Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,573 app. 2 (Sept. 12, 2013) (“We have witnessed a fundamental shift in
markets from human-based trading to highly automated electronic trading.”).
87 See Tom C.W. Lin, The New Investor, 60 UCLA L. REV. 678, 681–82 (2013) (introducing the concept
of cyborg finance).
88 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES, at
xvii, 44, 58 (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT] (discussing the rising importance of
financial technology); PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 36–38 (chronicling the growth of supercomputers in the
financial industry).
89 See Timothy Lavin, Monsters in the Market, THE ATLANTIC (July/August 2010), https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/monsters-in-the-market/308122/ [https://perma.cc/AD3G-4RPQ].
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management, two financial tasks that were previously done principally by
humans.90 Hedge funds use autonomous algorithmic software to read newsfeeds,
analyze data, and pick stocks to generate consistent positive returns.91
BlackRock, the world’s largest asset management company, uses a proprietary
artificial intelligence program, called Aladdin, to manage risk and allocate
investments on behalf of its institutional clients.92 During the financial crisis of
2008, BlackRock, using Aladdin, assisted the federal government with its
critical and thorny decisions relating to the bailouts of distressed firms like AIG,
Bear Stearns, and Citigroup.93 More recently, startup companies like
Wealthfront and Betterment use algorithmic programs exclusively to manage
the assets of investors, completely foregoing the traditional model of financial
advisors.94 Even the staid, clubby corporate bond market is being disrupted by
new financial technology as automated trading platforms have started to replace
bond traders and bond desks.95 In sum, this technological transformation of the
financial industry has rendered many established financial companies ostensibly
high-tech companies. Furthermore, some of the most promising and exciting
upstarts in the financial industry are dubbed “FinTech” firms because they are
using technology in innovative ways to challenge and change traditional
financial practices.96

90

Gerding, supra note 7, at 130–35.
See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 322–23; Bradley Hope, How Computers Trawl a Sea of Data for
Stock Picks, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 1, 2015, 10:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-computers-trawl-a-seaof-data-for-stock-picks-1427941801 [https://perma.cc/JF4K-YWJV]; Seth Stevenson, The Wolf of Wall Tweet,
SLATE (Apr. 20, 2015, 4:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2015/04/bot_makes_2_
4_million_reading_twitter_meet_the_guy_it_cost_a_fortune.html?wpsrc=fol_tw [https://perma.cc/9SCR-8H
XX].
92 See Sheelah Kolhatkar & Sree Vidya Bhaktavatsalam, The Colossus of Wall Street, BLOOMBERG (Dec.
9, 2010, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-12-09/the-colossus-of-wall-street [https://
perma.cc/2M2F-UD93].
93 Id.
94 John F. Wasik, Sites to Manage Personal Wealth Gaining Ground, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/11/your-money/sites-to-manage-personal-wealth-gaining-ground.html?_
r=0 [https://perma.cc/HR3Q-L2QB].
95 See Nathaniel Popper, Shouts on Bond-Trading Floor Yield to Robot Beeps, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2014,
8:09
PM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/shouts-on-bond-trading-floor-yield-to-robot-beeps/
[https://perma.cc/FX82-R9Y5]; Shawn Tully, The Man Behind the $7.7 Trillion Bond Revolution, FORTUNE
(Dec. 4, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/12/04/marketaxess-holdings-ceo-rick-mcvey/ [https://perma.cc/BY64BB6K].
96 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Fintech Firms Are Taking On the Big Banks, but Can They Win?, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/07/business/dealbook/fintech-firms-are-taking-on-the-bigbanks-but-can-they-win.html?rref=collection%2Fspotlightcollection%2Fdealbook-special-section
[https://perma.cc/QJR6-9R5E].
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The emergence of this new, technologically advanced financial reality
contains both virtues and vices. In terms of virtues, new financial technology
has expanded the capital markets, decreased transactional costs, lowered the cost
of capital for businesses, and provided convenient new tools for investors and
consumers.97 For instance, while high-frequency trading can present serious
drawbacks, it has also, in many instances, increased liquidity, accelerated
execution speeds, narrowed price spreads, and lowered transaction costs for
investors.98 Transactions that previously required hours of labor and hundreds
and thousands of dollars in commissions to a broker can now be executed in
seconds for a few dollars from one’s phone with a few taps. In 2017, it was
reported that currency traders were using smartphone apps to make $100 million
trades.99
In terms of vices, the new financial marketplace’s heavy emphasis on speed,
connectivity, and technology presented new interlocking risks for market
participants related to speed, connectivity, and complexity. First, analogous to
how the growing size of financial institutions gave rise to the systemic risk of
“too big to fail,”100 the growing emphasis on faster financial speed has created
the systemic risk of “too fast to save.”101 As evidenced by the Flash Crash and
Flash Boys, financial transactions occur at incredibly high velocities measured
in milliseconds. While the accelerating speed of finance has systemic benefits,
it also increases the likelihood that inadvertent errors, malicious acts, and
technological disruptions would harm the financial institutions and the financial
97 See, e.g., Korsmo, supra note 7, at 549–50 (cataloguing benefits relating to high-frequency trading);
Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, “Publicness” in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the
JOBS Act, 101 GEO. L.J. 337, 347 (2013) (“Today, liquidity is now much more possible outside of traditional
exchanges. In the new millennium, cheap information and low communication costs have expanded
markets . . . .”).
98 See, e.g., FRANK PARTNOY, WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 43 (2012) (discussing how highfrequency trading improves liquidity); Jonathan Brogaard, Terrence Hendershott & Ryan Riordan, HighFrequency Trading and Price Discovery, 27 REV. FIN. STUD. 2267, 2267 (2014) (highlighting how highfrequency trading improves price discovery); Joel Hasbrouck & Gideon Saar, Low-Latency Trading, 16 J. FIN.
MKTS. 646, 648 (2013) (suggesting that high-frequency trading has stabilizing marketplace effects); Korsmo,
supra note 7, at 549–50 (noting various benefits of high-frequency trading).
99 Emily Glazer, Behind J.P. Morgan’s $100 Million Cell Phone Trade, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2017/04/05/behind-j-p-morgans-100-million-cell-phone-trade/
[https://perma.cc/3GT3-TREL].
100 See S. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:
ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 15–17 (2011) (reporting on the regulatory challenges of “too big to fail”);
ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT
TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM CRISIS—AND THEMSELVES 538–39 (2009) (discussing the systemic risk
of “too big to fail” institutions).
101 See Lin, supra note 87, at 711–14 (introducing the concept of “too fast to save”).
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system before anyone can stop it.102 During periods of financial tumult and
distress, automated programs can exacerbate volatility and reduce liquidity by
rapidly eliminating trading positions in the marketplace.103 The emphasis on
speed has also meant that institutional safeguards have been sacrificed for higher
velocities, rendering it even more difficult to prevent institutional and systemic
harms.104 In the contemporary high-speed, automated marketplace, a
misinformed trader, a malicious actor, or a programming error can cause
significant institutional harm as well as systemic damage much more easily. For
instance, in 2008, a rogue trader nearly destroyed the prominent French
investment bank, Société Générale, with $69 billion in unauthorized positions
over a period of several months.105 Three years later, in 2011, another trader at
UBS, a leading Swiss investment bank, caused losses of $2.3 billion.106 In 2014,
the market for U.S. Treasuries experienced a 37-basis point swing during a few
minutes, one of the largest changes in one session ever, for no apparent reason.107
While such volatility and losses may have been possible in other eras, the
financial velocity of today’s marketplace made such bad acts more impactful
and more difficult to prevent.
Second, the new financial reality’s heavy emphasis on connectivity has
created the systemic risk of “too linked to fail.”108 In the new financial
marketplace, institutions, industries, and instruments are all intermediated and
interconnected like never before in a single high-tech financial network.109
102

See Floyd Norris, In Markets’ Tuned-Up Machinery, Stubborn Ghosts Remain, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22,
2013, 8:38 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/in-markets-tuned-up-machinery-stubborn-ghostsremain/ [https://perma.cc/C67P-FLPE]; see also Haldane, supra note 16 (“For the first time in financial history,
machines can execute trades far faster than humans can intervene.”); Andrei A. Kirilenko & Andrew W. Lo,
Moore’s Law Versus Murphy’s Law: Algorithmic Trading and Its Discontents, 27 J. ECON. PERSPS., Spring
2013, at 51, 60 (“[A]utomated trading systems provide enormous economies of scale and scope in managing
large portfolios, but trading errors can now accumulate losses at the speed of light before they’re discovered and
corrected by human oversight.”).
103 PARTNOY, supra note 98, at 43.
104 Frank J. Fabozzi, Sergio M. Focardi & Caroline Jonas, High-Frequency Trading: Methodologies and
Market Impact, 19 REV. FUTURES MKTS. 7, 11 (2011).
105 Nicola Clark, Rogue Trader at Société Générale Gets 3 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/06/business/global/06bank.html [https://perma.cc/FB3L-G9RV].
106 Julia Werdigier, UBS Says Trading Losses Were Closer to $2.3 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/19/business/global/ubs-says-trading-losses-closer-to-2-3-billion.html
[https://perma.cc/AVP2-Q2BX].
107 U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY ET AL., JOINT STAFF REPORT: THE U.S. TREASURY MARKET ON OCTOBER 15,
2014 (2015), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Joint_Staff_Report_Treasury_
10-15-2015.pdf.
108 See Lin, supra note 87, at 714–16 (introducing the concept of “too linked to fail”).
109 See Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007–2008, 23 J. ECON.
PERSPS., Winter 2009, at 77, 96–97 (discussing the financial system’s “interwoven network of financial
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Distinct from “too big to fail,” this emerging systemic risk of “too linked to fail”
includes smaller participants and products, whose actions and failures may
ripple across the system because of their connectivity regardless of their
individual value or size.110 A further complication is the fact that many
interconnected financial participants in the new marketplace engage in similar
and interdependent strategies.111 As a result, the failing or flaw of one participant
could not only adversely impact others, but could also create vicious cycles of
volatility for the entire financial system as trades cascade and generate feedback
loops and spillover effects of serious consequences.112 Waddell & Reed, for
instance, is not a systemically important financial institution, yet because of the
connectivity of the new financial marketplace, a single trade from that firm
served as an important catalyst in the Flash Crash, which at one point generated
a trillion dollars in losses.113
Third, the new financial reality’s heavy reliance on complex technological
systems also poses new risks beyond those associated with speed and
connectivity. Complex, technological systems like the ones driving our financial
markets are inherently prone to accidents, as described by Charles Perrow in his
seminal study on the risks of technology, Normal Accidents.114 As such, “normal
financial accidents” will become more common as the financial markets grow
more reliant on complex, high-tech systems.115 In the last few years, both the
New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ experienced serious technical
obligations”); Robin Greenwood & David S. Scharfstein, How to Make Finance Work, HARV. BUS. REV. (Mar.
2012), https://hbr.org/2012/03/how-to-make-finance-work; HAL S. SCOTT, COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS.
REGULATION, INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION (2012), http://www.aei.org/files/2013/01/08/interconnectedness-and-contagion-by-hal-scott_153927406281.pdf.
110 See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 200 (2008) (discussing the systemic risks
caused by financial intermediation and disintermediation).
111 Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61358, 75 Fed. Reg. 3594,
3611 (Jan. 21, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (“[M]any proprietary firms potentially could engage in
similar or connected trading strategies that, if such strategies generated significant losses at the same time, could
cause many proprietary firms to become financially distressed and lead to large fluctuations in market prices.”);
Bernard S. Donefer, Algos Gone Wild: Risk in the World of Automated Trading Strategies, 5 J. TRADING, Spring
2010, at 31, 31.
112 See BROWN, supra note 57, at 7; PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 9–10 (discussing the financial dangers of
“a vicious self-reinforcing feedback loop”); Louise Story & Graham Bowley, Market Swings Are Becoming New
Standard, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/12/business/economy/stock-marketssharp-swings-grow-more-frequent.html [https://perma.cc/TX93-NLRX]; Surowiecki, supra note 46 (“Highspeed firms tend to mimic one another’s trading strategies, and in times of crisis this can amplify price swings.”).
113 See supra Part I.A.1.
114 See CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 4–5 (1999).
115 Marc Schneiberg & Tim Bartley, Regulating or Redesigning Finance? Market Architectures, Normal
Accidents, and Dilemmas of Regulatory Reform, in MARKETS ON TRIAL: THE ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS: PART A 281, 284–89 (Michael Lounsbury & Paul M. Hirsch eds., 2010).
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glitches that halted trading for several hours during otherwise normal trading
days.116 Furthermore, the new financial reality’s heavy reliance on technology
exposes the marketplace to new forms of misconduct, malfeasance, and
manipulation that were technologically impossible in previous eras.117 For
example, in the last few years alone, hacked social media accounts and false data
entered into the SEC’s EDGAR electronic filing system have been used to
manipulate the stock market in the United States.118 In 2016, Federal Reserve
Chairwoman Janet Yellen testified before Congress that cyberattacks on the
financial industry represent “one of the most significant risk our country
faces.”119
In sum, the events of the Flash Crash and the story told in Flash Boys are
part of a larger, unfolding narrative about the rise of artificial intelligence,
automation, and other forms of technology in the new financial marketplace. As
entrepreneurs and technologists continue to push for faster speeds, greater
connectivity, and better technology, the financial marketplace will gain
numerous benefits as well as face a multitude of dangers, including new
systemic risks and new forms of market manipulation.120

116 See E.S. Browning & Scott Patterson, Market Size + Complex Systems = More Glitches, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 22, 2013, 10:49 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788732398060457902934200
1534148 [https://perma.cc/EC6K-JCSQ]; Nathaniel Popper, Pricing Problem Suspends NASDAQ for Three
Hours, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:52 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/nasdaq-market-haltstrading/ [https://perma.cc/5MAK-JHN3]; Nathaniel Popper, The Stock Market Bell Rings, Computers Fail, Wall
Street Cringes, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/business/dealbook/new-yorkstock-exchange-suspends-trading.html [https://perma.cc/D734-NEZ3].
117 See, e.g., Chiara Albanese, Daniele Lepido & Giles Turner, ‘Anonymous’ Joins Hacker Army Targeting
Central Banks for Cash, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2017, 4:33 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2017-03-17/-anonymous-joins-hacker-army-targeting-central-banks-for-cash [https://perma.cc/
Q6K4-46SZ].
118 See, e.g., Chozick & Perlroth, supra note 48; Goldstein, supra note 3.
119 Albanese, supra note 117.
120 See, e.g., Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61358, 75 Fed.
Reg. 3594, 3609–10 (Jan. 21, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (highlighting the accelerating velocity of the
financial marketplace); A. D. Wissner-Gross & C. E. Freer, Relativistic Statistical Arbitrage, 82 PHYSICAL REV.
056104-1, 056104-1 to -2 (2010) (studying trading arbitrage near the speed of light); Graham Bowley, The New
Speed of Money, Reshaping Markets, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/
business/02speed.html [https://perma.cc/P7E3-W379] (reporting on the unprecedented race for faster financial
trading speeds); Quentin Hardy, A Strange Computer Promises Great Speed, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/22/technology/testing-a-new-class-of-speedy-computer.html [https://perma.
cc/9HP4-UBW9]; Jesse Westbrook & Sam Mamudi, Wall Street Buys NATO Microwave Towers in Quest for
Speed, BLOOMBERG (July 16, 2014, 2:49 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-15/wallstreet-grabs-nato-towers-in-traders-speed-of-light-quest [https://perma.cc/J7EN-KCJW].
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B. The Early Regulatory Response
Policymakers and regulators have recognized the structural changes afoot
within the financial marketplace and have begun responding to these
fundamental changes.121 One of the chief tasks for policymakers and regulators
in coming years centers on how best to upgrade a twentieth-century financial
infrastructure for the financial innovations of the twenty-first century, like highfrequency trading and algorithmic wealth management. Policymakers need to
ensure that the financial infrastructure is secure, stable, and sustainable in light
of the unfolding developments in the marketplace. This responsibility is akin to
making certain that a transportation system built for a world of horse-drawn
carriages is safe, stable, and sustainable for a world of high-speed, self-driven
cars. The early regulatory responses to the new unfolding financial reality of the
marketplace suggest that policymakers and regulators will likely enhance their
own technological capabilities, carefully target critical components in the
marketplace, and leverage market-oriented modes of regulation as means to
better govern the new financial marketplace.
Following the Flash Crash and years prior to the publication of Flash Boys,
policymakers and regulators, like those at the SEC, had already been focused on
the integrity of the financial markets in light of new technology, and they
continued with a renewed focus after the outcry that followed the book’s
publication. Policymakers and regulators have focused on enhancing their own
technological capabilities to better govern the marketplace. In recent years, the
SEC developed more quantitative and technological capabilities and initiatives,
such as the Center for Risk and Quantitative Analytics, the National Exam
Analytics Tool (NEAT), and the Market Information Data Analytics System
(MIDAS), to keep up with the changing marketplace.122 Additionally, in 2014,
the SEC adopted Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity (Regulation
SCI) to update the regulatory framework for a marketplace that is more

121 See, e.g., Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading
Environments, 78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,546–48 (Sept. 12, 2013).
122 See Scott Patterson, Meet the SEC’s Brainy New Crime Fighters, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2014, 10:39
PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-the-secs-brainy-new-crime-fighters-1418601581 [https://perma.cc/
U5K6-CTJK]; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Announces Enforcement Initiatives to Combat
Financial Reporting and Microcap Fraud and Enhance Risk Analysis (July 2, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/News/
PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1365171624975#.VJm7DEAQE; Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n, Speech at the 41st Annual Securities Regulation Institute: The SEC in 2014 (Jan. 27, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370540677500#UvUmcPldV8E.
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fragmented and technologically driven by disparate electronic systems.123
Regulation SCI builds on Regulation Alternative Trading System and
Regulation National Market System, the two bodies of rules from the past
decade that ushered in today’s electronically driven marketplace.124 Following
the Flash Boys fallout, the SEC and others have continued to develop safeguards
and rules for the new financial marketplace with a renewed effort.125 There have
been proposals and implementations of mechanisms, such as new circuit
breakers and kill switches, to guard against the accelerating velocities and
volatilities of the marketplace.126 There have also been proposals and
implementations of mechanisms like tick-size experimentation and consolidated
audit trails that would provide more information to regulators about the activities
taking place in dark pools and other alternative trading platforms.127
In setting forth new rules and regulations, policymakers will likely shift from
a traditional, omnibus, government-oriented mode of financial regulation
towards a more targeted, market-oriented mode of regulation, given the diversity
of participants and platforms in the modern marketplace. This shift in regulatory
posture could yield a number of significant benefits for the marketplace. First,
targeted regulation would help reduce some of the harmful, unintended
consequences that accompany one-size-fits-all, omnibus regulation.128 The days
of a few dominant public exchanges have given way to an era of numerous
public and private trading platforms linked together by complex communication
networks; thus, one top-down body of regulation would likely be too blunt for
today’s diverse financial ecosystem. Targeted rules for distinct participants and
platforms would be more appropriate in this environment. Early actions from

123 Regulation Systems Compliance and Integrity, Exchange Act Release No. 34-73639, 79 Fed. Reg.
72,252, 72,252 (Dec. 5, 2014) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242, 249).
124 See 17 C.F.R. § 242.300(a) (2017); 17 C.F.R. § 242.601; see also Lin, supra note 7, at 572–73
(describing how these two regulations helped facilitate modern financial innovations over the last decade).
125 See, e.g., White, supra note 82.
126 See Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at Practicing Law Institute’s SEC Speaks
in 2013 Program: Addressing Market Instability Through Informed and Smart Regulation (Feb. 22, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171492386#.U_OoCMZP8pE;
Investor
Bulletin:
Measures to Address Market Volatility, SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/
circuitbreakersbulletin.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2017).
127 See 17 C.F.R. § 242.613; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Pilot to Assess Tick
Size Impact for Smaller Companies (May 6, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-82.html.
128 See J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The Problem of Regulatory Accretion in
the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757, 814 (2003) (“The unintended consequences of a rule thus emerge
from the complex interactions between the full set of rules and the human behaviors they motivate.”); Whitehead,
supra note 7, at 1270 (“There is . . . a real risk that new rules will have unanticipated consequences, particularly
in a system as complex as today’s financial markets.”).
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policymakers and regulators suggest a move toward more targeted financial
regulation. For instance, in 2015, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
(FINRA) proposed a targeted amendment to its existing rules as a means to
govern algorithmic trading, which the SEC subsequently approved in 2016.129
Instead of seeking a sweeping rule in response to the rise of algorithmic trading,
FINRA attempted to craft a carefully tailored rule that targeted certain critical
parties in the industry.
Second, more market-oriented modes of regulation in many circumstances
may be better suited than the traditional government-oriented mode of regulation
to achieve the regulatory aims of policymakers in light of contemporary political
considerations and the dynamism of financial innovation.130 More marketoriented regulation that sensibly marshals public and private resources can break
down some of the structural barriers of jurisdiction, origination, and resource
scarcity faced by domestic and international government regulators.131 Marketoriented regulation already plays an important role in financial regulation;
therefore, the baseline question is not about instituting market-oriented
regulation but is instead about how to do it better.132 This suggestion for smart
market-oriented regulation is not about deregulation but is instead about better
matching the comparative advantages of government forces with the
comparative advantages of market forces.133 For instance, mindful of its lack of
technical sophistication, the SEC enlisted private companies from the
marketplace to help it establish its consolidated audit trail database of market
information rather than building one through the government’s bureaucracy.134
In contrast to pure public regulation, which can be slow and blunt, market129 See Regulatory Notice 15-06: Registration of Associated Person Who Develop Algorithmic Trading
Strategies, FIN. INDUS. REG. AUTH. (Mar. 2015), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/
Notice_Regulatory_15-06.pdf.
130 Levitin, supra note 7, at 2068.
131 See Lin, supra note 7, at 590–95 (discussing the limitations of public law in regulating modern finance).
132 See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12
(2013); Roberta S. Karmel, Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations Be Considered
Government Agencies?, 14 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 151, 151 (2008); Omarova, supra note 7, at 413.
133 See, e.g., WILLIAM D. EGGERS & PAUL MACMILLAN, THE SOLUTION REVOLUTION: HOW BUSINESS,
GOVERNMENT, AND SOCIAL ENTERPRISES ARE TEAMING UP TO SOLVE SOCIETY’S TOUGHEST PROBLEMS 3–16
(2013); MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR
MYTHS 9–15 (2015); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea That For-Profit Corporations
Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 136 (2012) (“In the end, policy makers should not delude themselves
about the corporation’s ability to police itself; government still has a critical role in setting the rules of the
game.”).
134 Matthew Philips & Silla Brush, SEC Computer Called CAT Will Peer into Dark Pools, Track Orders,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 7, 2014, 12:24 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-07/sec-computercalled-cat-will-peer-into-dark-pools-track-orders [https://perma.cc/3M27-Y8DN].
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oriented regulation, in some cases, can be more knowledgeable and more
responsive to the practices of the rapidly changing marketplace.135 More marketoriented regulation will likely also have the added benefit of encouraging
experimentation and competition in the marketplace.136 After all, it was Brad
Katsuyama and his team, not government bureaucrats, who created a workable,
competitive antidote to the ills of high-frequency trading and market
manipulation through private experimentation.
In sum, the early regulatory response to the sea change in the marketplace
suggests that policymakers and regulators will likely enhance their own
technological capabilities, carefully target critical components in the
marketplace, and leverage market-oriented modes of regulation as a means to
better govern the new financial marketplace. While promising, the early
regulatory response to the unfolding developments also suggests that much work
still needs to be done to protect the integrity of the marketplace from emerging
inherent systemic risks and new external methods of market manipulation.
III. OLD AND NEW MARKET MANIPULATION
Market manipulation, broadly defined, has existed since the infancy of
financial markets.137 In the landmark securities case, Santa Fe Industries v.
Green, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that market manipulation “refers generally
to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are
intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.”138
Markets are populated by both upstanding participants and disreputable ones.
This is true of the markets of the Rockefellers and the Great Depression, as well
as of the markets of the Flash Crash and the Flash Boys.139 Manipulated markets
not only distort the prices and transactions in one marketplace, but they also have
important implications for capital allocation, investments, and savings in other
135 See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, the Modern Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of
a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 412 (1989) (noting the lack of regulatory expertise in
connection with some complex financial products).
136 For a general discussion of regulatory and policy experimentation, see, e.g., JIM MANZI,
UNCONTROLLED: THE SURPRISING PAYOFF OF TRIAL-AND-ERROR FOR BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 209–
11 (2012); Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 933–
34 (2011); Zachary Gubler, Experimental Rules, 55 B.C. L. REV. 129, 136–37 (2014); Yair Listokin, Learning
Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 483–84 (2008); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon,
Minimalism and Experimentalism in the Administrative State, 100 GEO. L.J. 53, 60–61, 78 (2011).
137 See JERRY W. MARKHAM, LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE HISTORY OF FINANCIAL MARKET
MANIPULATION 9–14 (2014) (chronicling various episodes of market manipulation throughout ancient history).
138 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
139 See MARKHAM, supra note 137, at xiii–xiv.
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markets and the greater economy.140 The modes of market manipulation are only
limited by the imagination and deviousness of humans.141 As financial markets
evolve from human operations to electronic operations, the methods of market
manipulation have evolved in kind, with old market manipulation giving way to
new market manipulation.142 To better understand the emerging methods of
market manipulation, it may be instructive to highlight and compare some of the
new methods with some of the common traditional methods of market
manipulation.
A. Traditional Market Manipulation
Traditional market manipulation is normally effectuated through human
actors using distortive market power, deceit, misinformation, and illicit
information in dealings with other human actors in the marketplace. Generally,
the goal of traditional market manipulation is to distort the natural price of
certain financial instruments or transactions to the benefit of the manipulative
party.143 These traditional attempts at market distortion can manifest in various
forms. A few of the more common and prominent methods of traditional market
manipulation include cornering, squeezing, front running, wash trading,
pumping-and-dumping, and benchmark distortion.
1. Cornering and Squeezing
Cornering and squeezing, which use market power to distort the prices of a
financial instrument, are two of the oldest forms of market manipulation.144
Cornering generally occurs when one or more parties acquire the total supply of
140 See, e.g., Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 7, at 196 (“The performance of the equities market has
important effects on the efficiency with which goods and services are produced in our economy and on the real
economy’s rate of growth. Equities also play a vital role as a place for ordinary individuals to invest their
savings.”).
141 Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971) (“The methods and techniques of
manipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of man.”).
142 See, e.g., Tālis J. Putniņš, Market Manipulation: A Survey, 26 J. ECON. SURVS. 952, 955–62 (2012)
(surveying studies and theories on market manipulation).
143 See James Wm. Moore and Frank M. Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 U. CHI.
L. REV. 46, 50 (1934) (“The term ‘manipulation’ may, in short, be applied to any practice which has as its
purpose the deliberate raising, lowering or pegging of security prices. . . . Manipulation leads to an artificial and
controlled price.” (footnote omitted)); Chester Spatt, Security Market Manipulation, 6 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON.
405, 407 (2014) (“The investor in a classical manipulation is attempting to influence artificially the price as a
way to gain potential advantage.”).
144 See, e.g., MARKHAM, supra note 137, at 17–25 (describing various historical manipulation episodes
involving the use of cornering and squeezing); FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPORT ON THE GRAIN TRADE VOL. VII:
EFFECTS OF FUTURE TRADING 244 (1926) (discussing cornering in the grain industry in the 1920s).
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a financial instrument or commodity and then dictate the market prices of that
instrument or commodity, thereby manipulating natural price discovery of the
marketplace.145 Squeezing operates in a similar manner. Squeezing generally
occurs when one or more parties acquire a substantial supply of a financial
instrument or commodity and then use their market power to manipulate market
prices in their favor.146 Both cornering and squeezing usually require large sums
of capital to execute and sustain because they require the manipulative party to
capture a dominant position in a particular market.147
Cornering and squeezing are less prevalent in the public capital markets
today than in the past because of regulatory and market developments. In terms
of regulatory developments, the initial passage and evolving enforcement of
landmark legislation like the Sherman Antitrust Act, the Futures Trading Act,
the Grains Future Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and the Commodity
Exchange Act outlawed many forms of cornering and squeezing that were more
prevalent during periods prior to the passage of these laws.148 Beyond legal
developments, the growth in financial markets has also made it more difficult
for parties to acquire a complete or dominant position in a particular market to
execute a cornering or squeezing scheme. As a rough macroeconomic
barometer, the Dow Jones Industrial Average stood around 90 in January 1916
and over 16,000 in January 2016, exhibiting an exponential growth of over
17,000% in a century, not adjusting for inflation.149 Markets for the financial
instruments of significant publicly traded companies are also more difficult to
corner or squeeze because of their large values. For instance, at one point in
2017, Apple had a market cap exceeding $800 billion, and Facebook had a
market cap exceeding $400 billion.150 Nevertheless, despite the decrease of
cornering and squeezing schemes because of regulatory and market
developments, these manipulative schemes still exist in discrete markets during

145

MARKHAM, supra note 137, at 3.
Id.
147 Id.
148 See id. at 44, 50–51, 76–90 (discussing the passage and impact of various landmark legislation on market
manipulation).
149 Dow Jones—100 Year Historical Chart, MACROTRENDS, http://www.macrotrends.net/1319/dow-jones100-year-historical-chart [https://perma.cc/72NE-CTAR] (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
150 See Anita Balakrishan, Apple Market Cap Tops $800 Billion for the First Time, CNBC.COM (May 8,
2017, 1:45 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/08/apple-market-capitalization-hits-800-billion.html [https://
perma.cc/8N9Z-7VTR]; Jonathan Taplin, Is It Time to Break Up Google?, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/22/opinion/sunday/is-it-time-to-break-up-google.html (charting Facebook’s
market cap at $414 billion as of April 20, 2017).
146
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illiquid circumstances when one or more particular parties can acquire a
dominant position.151
2. Front Running
Front running is a manipulative scheme where one party, frequently a broker,
executes a trade, mindful that a market-moving trade is forthcoming in either the
same or a related financial instrument. In such a scheme, the broker prioritizes
his own trade ahead of the market-moving order to benefit himself in breach of
a duty owed to clients.152 Front running is generally considered illegal and a
form of securities fraud.153 Securities regulations explicitly prohibit front
running large block trades of securities by broker-dealers.154
Front running distorts the fair execution of trades in the marketplace and
allows parties with inside information about forthcoming trades to manipulate
the marketplace for personal gain in violation of the law and in breach of their
duties to their clients.155 For instance, a broker can front run shares of Goldman
Sachs if he executes a sell order for his own account after receiving—but before
processing—a large sell order from Warren Buffett that is likely to move the
price of Goldman shares downward. Similarly, a broker can facilitate front
running by sharing his knowledge of a forthcoming order with a favored party,
allowing that party to generate a quick gain with a timely trade.156
3. Wash Trading
Wash trading is a manipulation scheme whereby one or more parties execute
sham orders with the goal of creating artificial movements in volume and price
in the marketplace for their own benefit.157 Wash trading can inflate prices of a

151

See JOHN L. TEALL, FINANCIAL TRADING AND INVESTING 336 (2013) (discussing select incidents of
cornering and squeezing).
152 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 574 (6th ed. 2009) (explaining
variations of front running); Jerry W. Markham, “Front-Running”—Insider Trading Under the Commodity
Exchange Act, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 69, 70–71 (1988) (defining front running).
153 See TEALL, supra note 151, at 330–31; Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 7, at 227 n.87
(“Traditional front running is prohibited under the common law, federal law, and industry self-regulatory
standards.”).
154 See FINRA RULE 5270 (FINRA 2013); Exchange Act Release No. 34-14156, 1977 WL 190058, at *1
(Nov. 9, 1977).
155 See HAZEN, supra note 152, at 574.
156 See HOWARD M. FRIEDMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CYBERSPACE § 16–79 (3d ed. 2001 & Supp.
2008).
157 TEALL, supra note 151, at 337.
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financial instrument as the manipulating parties execute trade after trade at
increasing prices, thereby causing unwitting, innocent parties to buy those
instruments at artificially inflated prices.158 Conversely, wash trading can also
be a scheme to drive prices downward. The manipulating party or parties, in
either scenario, are exposed to no real financial risk and stand only to gain from
their deceitful methods that create illusory movements in prices and volume.159
While wash trading schemes are frequently initiated to manipulate prices, they
can also be initiated to generate rebates and kickbacks from vendors like
exchanges and brokers.160 Congress and the courts have long frowned upon wash
trading as an illegal threat to the proper and fair functions of financial markets.161
4. Pumping-and-Dumping
The pump-and-dump scheme generally operates by a manipulating party
acquiring a position in a financial instrument, like a stock, then artificially
inflating the stock through fraudulent promotion before selling its position to
unsuspecting parties at the inflated price, which often crashes after the sale.162
Cheaply-priced securities, so-called “penny stocks,” that are traded in less
regulated, illiquid, over-the-counter markets are particularly vulnerable to these
schemes because of their low values and the lack of information about them.163
The pump-and-dump scheme has existed for centuries in financial markets,

158

See Charles R.P. Pouncy, The Scienter Requirement and Wash Trading in Commodity Futures: The
Knowledge Lost in Knowing, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1625, 1637 (1995) (“Wash trading . . . is the archetypical
form of fictitious trading.”).
159 See MARKHAM, supra note 137, at 7–8.
160 See, e.g., Amanat v. SEC, 269 F. App’x 217, 220 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming on the illegality of wash
trades designed to generate vendor rebates).
161 See, e.g., Wilson v. CFTC, 322 F.3d 555, 559 (8th Cir. 2003) (opining that wash sales are “harmful
because they create illusory price movements in the market”); Graham v. SEC, 222 F.3d 994, 996, 1003 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (characterizing wash sales as illegal stock market manipulation); SEC v. U.S. Envtl. Inc., 155 F.3d
107, 112 (2d Cir. 1998) (finding wash sales as violations of federal securities antifraud law); Rosenberg v. Hano,
121 F.2d 818, 820 (3d Cir. 1941) (“[A]n honest security market depended on more than the exclusion of the
cruder form of lying, such as wash sales, matched orders, and the like. . . . Such appraisal to be trustworthy . . .
must reflect the honest judgment of those whose reason for buying is independent of and uninfluenced by its
own probable effect.”); Scopino, supra note 84, at 266 (“Congress made wash sales illegal in 1936 with the
passage of the CEA [Commodities Exchange Act] . . . .”).
162 See Spatt, supra note 143, at 408 (“[A] pump and dump involves a trader ‘pumping’ up the price of a
company by spreading false information to many unsophisticated (often retail) investors to push up the share
prices and then ‘dumping’ the trader’s shares.”); “Pump-and-Dumps” and Market Manipulations, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N.: FAST ANSWERS, http://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm (last modified June 25, 2013)
(“Once these fraudsters ‘dump’ their shares and stop hyping the stock, the price typically falls, and investors
lose their money.”).
163 MARKHAM, supra note 137, at 257.
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particularly those involving securities.164 It has been traced back as far as the
“South Sea Bubble” during the 1700s.165
More modern variations of pump-and-dump schemes involve the use of
boiler rooms, Internet chat rooms, fraudulent websites, social media, and spam
e-mails to artificially inflate securities as part of the manipulative scheme. First,
boiler rooms refer to operations that promote securities via aggressive tactics to
perpetuate securities fraud.166 These aggressive tactics include high pressure
cold calling, assuring high returns, and outright lying about the promoted
securities.167 These tactics are well depicted in popular culture through movies
like Boiler Room and The Wolf of Wall Street.168
Second, the advent of the Internet created new ways to execute pump-anddump schemes. Fraudsters promoted securities via chat rooms, websites, social
media, and e-mails with the intent of hyping and selling nearly worthless
securities to unsuspecting parties at artificially inflated prices.169 Furthermore,
new information technology substantially lowered the cost of fraudulently
promoting a company, allowing sophisticated con artists as well as amateurs like
high school students to manipulate markets with pump-and-dump schemes.170
Over the years, policymakers and regulators have tried vigilantly to combat
pump-and-dump schemes through enforcement actions, new regulation, and
new legislation. The SEC, for instance, has taken a number of pump-and-dump
cases to trial.171 The SEC also created the Office of Internet Enforcement to

164

Id.
1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS
TO THE ROBBER BARONS (1492–1900), at 97–99 (2002).
166 HAZEN, supra note 152, at 618–19.
167 Id.; 3 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: FROM THE AGE OF
DERIVATIVES INTO THE NEW MILLENNIUM (1970–2001), at 53–54 (2002); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND
MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 24 (1982).
168 BOILER ROOM (New Line Cinema 2000); THE WOLF OF WALL STREET (Paramount Pictures 2013).
169 Nancy Toross, Comment, Double-Click on This: Keeping Pace with On-Line Market Manipulation, 32
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1399, 1418–21 (1999); OFFICE OF INV’R EDUC. & ADVOCACY, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
INVESTOR ALERT: SOCIAL MEDIA AND INVESTING—AVOIDING FRAUD 1 (2012), http://www.sec.gov/investor/
alerts/socialmediaandfraud.pdf.
170 See MICHAEL LEWIS, NEXT: THE FUTURE JUST HAPPENED 27–28 (2002) (chronicling a lucrative market
manipulation scheme initiated by a high school student); JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF
MODERN U.S. CORPORATE SCANDALS: FROM ENRON TO REFORM 27–29 (2006) (discussing pump-and-dump
schemes involving characters of varying sophistication).
171 E.g., SEC v. Whittemore, 659 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. Blinder, 10 F.3d 1468, 1471
(9th Cir. 1993); SEC v. Park, 99 F. Supp. 2d 889, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2000); SEC v. Berliner, Litigation Release No.
165
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battle these attempts at market manipulation.172 Furthermore, mindful that many
of the schemes involve penny stocks, Congress passed the Securities
Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 to better protect
investors and the marketplace from pump-and-dump schemes.173
5. Benchmark Distortion
Benchmark distortion generally operates by manipulating an influential
standard or metric that is affiliated with various financial instruments and
products in the marketplace.174 By distorting the accuracy of benchmarks,
manipulating parties can distort affiliated financial instruments and products in
their favor to the detriment of honest participants in the marketplace.175
Financial markets are highly reliant on benchmarks as informational gauges
of performance and value.176 The Dow and the S&P 500 represent the value and
performance of the U.S. stock market.177 The gross domestic product (GDP)
summarizes the economic performance of a country.178 The consumer price
index (CPI) indicates the cost of living by estimating the changes in prices of a
basket of common goods and services.179 The London InterBank Offered Rate
(LIBOR) measures the interest rates between banks.180 These and other financial
benchmarks are frequently tied to numerous financial instruments that are traded
in the marketplace. For instance, numerous widely held mutual funds, index
funds, and exchange-traded funds are tied directly to the Dow and the S&P
500.181 Similarly, the prices of bonds are influenced directly by LIBOR as it sets
the baseline for pricing many bonds.182

20537, 93 SEC Docket 214 (Apr. 24, 2008); SEC v. Ampudia, Litigation Release No. 20071, 90 SEC Docket
1178 (Apr. 6, 2007).
172 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ENFORCEMENT INTERNET PROGRAM: AUDIT NO. 352 (2003), http://
www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/352fin.htm.
173 Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (1990).
174 Andrew Verstein, Benchmark Manipulation, 56 B.C. L. REV. 215, 217–18 (2015).
175 Id. at 218.
176 Gabriel Rauterberg & Andrew Verstein, Index Theory: The Law, Promise and Failure of Financial
Indices, 30 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 5–6 (2013).
177 See HERBERT B. MAYO, INVESTMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION 345, 349–50 (10th ed. 2011) (explaining the
Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P 500 Index).
178 See id. at 376 (defining the gross domestic product).
179 See id. at 380–81 (explaining the consumer price index).
180 STEPHEN BLYTH, AN INTRODUCTION TO QUANTITATIVE FINANCE 27 (2014).
181 See GARY L. GASTINEAU, THE EXCHANGE-TRADED FUNDS MANUAL 108–10 (2d ed. 2010) (discussing
widely held exchange traded funds tied to the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the S&P 500 Index).
182 See BLYTH, supra note 180, at 128–29.
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Given the importance of benchmarks to financial markets, parties that
attempt to manipulate the markets find benchmarks to be attractive targets.
Distorting benchmarks requires less capital and can have greater impact than
attempting to directly disrupt particular markets.183 For instance, it would be
incredibly expensive and cumbersome for one party to manipulate the multitrillion dollar corporate bond or foreign exchange markets by directly trading
bonds and currencies in its favor since doing so would require a large sum of
capital and significant effort. However, a few significant parties can collude to
distort key interest rates and foreign exchange benchmarks. As such, if colluding
parties are able to manipulate key benchmarks, they then can indirectly
manipulate all of the corporate bond, foreign exchange contracts, swaps, and
derivatives tied to those key benchmarks.184 In fact, between 2012 and 2015,
numerous large financial institutions like Barclays, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank,
JPMorgan Chase, Royal Bank of Scotland, and UBS paid billions of dollars in
fines for their involvement in manipulating interest rates via LIBOR and foreign
exchange rates over the course of many years.185
B. New Market Manipulation
In contrast to the analog, human protagonists of traditional market
manipulation, new market manipulation generally uses the electronic
communications, information systems, and algorithmic platforms of the new,
high-tech financial marketplace to unfairly distort information and prices
relating to financial instruments or transactions. At its core, these distortive
actions and effects tamper with the humans and computerized information and
communications systems of the marketplace. They corrupt how humans and
machines communicate between and amongst each other in the financial
markets. As such, this Article has termed this new approach to market

183

Verstein, supra note 174, at 224–25.
See, e.g., Kristin N. Johnson, Governing Financial Markets: Regulating Conflicts, 88 WASH. L. REV.
185, 188–89 (2013) (discussing the effects of LIBOR manipulation on the markets of various financial
instruments).
185 See DAVID ENRICH, THE SPIDER NETWORK: THE WILD STORY OF A MATH GENIUS, A GANG OF
BACKSTABBING BANKERS, AND ONE OF THE GREATEST SCAMS IN FINANCIAL HISTORY 4–6 (2017); In re LIBORBased Fin. Instruments Antitrust Litig., 962 F. Supp. 2d 606 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Michael Corkery & Ben Protess,
Rigging of Foreign Exchange Market Makes Felons of Top Banks, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 2015), https://www.
nytimes.com/2015/05/21/business/dealbook/5-big-banks-to-pay-billions-and-plead-guilty-in-currency-andinterest-rate-cases.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/R5VA-PGKS]; Ben Protess & Jack Ewing, Deutsche Bank to
Pay $2.5 Billion Fine to Settle Rate-Rigging Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/04/24/business/dealbook/deutsche-bank-settlement-rates.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/HF9F-2TLU].
184
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manipulation, cybernetic market manipulation.186 While cybernetic market
manipulation generally shares the same goal as its traditional counterpart, it can
be much more impactful because of the unparalleled interconnectedness and
unprecedented value of modern financial markets. In some instances, cybernetic
market manipulation represents the use of new financial technology to carry out
old illicit schemes. In other instances, it represents the use of new financial
technology to carry out new illicit schemes. A few of the more common and
prominent methods of cybernetic market manipulation are pinging, spoofing,
electronic front running, and mass misinformation.
1. Pinging and Spoofing
Pinging and spoofing are two new methods of market manipulation that
leverage the new financial technologies of the marketplace to distort the ordinary
price discovery process in financial markets.
With pinging, a larger number of small orders for a particular financial
instrument are submitted and cancelled in fractions of a second by computerized
platforms to induce others in the marketplace to react to their “pings” and
disclose their trading intentions to the pinging party.187 Pinging allows the
initiating party to discern valuable information at little to no risk since most of
the pinging orders are cancelled prior to execution.188 For instance, Honest
Abbie wants to buy 100,000 shares of Acme at any price up to $50 per share.
Dishonest John, using the pinging strategy, sends out numerous small orders to
sell Acme shares at various prices with no intention of honoring them. Honest
Abbie reacts to Dishonest John’s orders and reveals her preferred volume and
price points. Rather than being able to fulfill her large order at various price
points, Honest Abbie will likely end up paying $50 or more per share for her
entire order since she has unwittingly revealed her preferences to her devious
pinging counterparty. When pinging is done on a large scale, over a sustained
period, it can cost investors and the marketplace significant sums of capital.189
186 See Cybernetics, OXFORD DICTIONARY, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/cybernetics
(defining cybernetics as “the science of communications and automatic control systems in both machines and
living things”); NORBERT WIENER, CYBERNETICS OR CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION IN THE ANIMAL AND THE
MACHINE 12–16 (2d ed. 2013) (introducing and explaining the theory of cybernetics).
187 See IRENE ALDRIDGE, HIGH-FREQUENCY TRADING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO ALGORITHMIC STRATEGIES
AND TRADING SYSTEMS 201 (2d ed. 2013) (highlighting pinging and similar strategies); see also BROWN, supra
note 57, at 113 (defining and discussing the process of pinging).
188 BROWN, supra note 57, at 113.
189 See, e.g., Gregory Scopino, The (Questionable) Legality of High-Speed “Pinging” and “Front Running”
in the Futures Market, 47 CONN. L. REV. 607, 622–28 (2015).
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With spoofing, orders are placed by computerized platforms for a financial
instrument at prices outside the current bona fide limits to spook other market
participants to react in a manner favorable to the spoofing party.190 Spoofing
allows the initiating party to distort the ordinary price discovery in the
marketplace by placing orders with no intention of ever executing them and
merely for the purpose of manipulating honest participants in the marketplace.191
For instance, if shares of Citigroup are trading between $59.98 and $60.05 per
share, a spoofing party will submit and cancel multiple limit orders to sell
100,000 shares at $59.90 to trick others in the market into off-loading their
positions before the stock drops. In 2010, FINRA sanctioned Trillium Brokerage
Services with $1 million in fines for engaging in illicit spoofing via their high
frequency trading programs.192 As noted earlier, part of the charges against
Navinder Sarao alleged that he used spoofing to manipulate the market tied to
S&P 500 futures and contributed to the Flash Crash.193
Both pinging and spoofing are made possible by the evolution of market
operations from a manual enterprise to a computerized enterprise.194 The rise of
autonomous, high-speed supercomputers running on smart algorithms made
both methods of market manipulation possible and profitable since both pinging
and spoofing require the rapid submission and cancellation of voluminous orders
measured in seconds.195 Human traders and brokers who gather and execute
trades in time increments measured in minutes and hours are simply too slow to
execute these schemes in a profitable manner, given the voluminous order

190 See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 6c(a)(5)(C) (2012) (defining spoofing); Françios-Serge
Lhabitant & Greg N. Gregoriou, High Frequency Trading: Past, Present, and Future, in THE HANDBOOK OF
HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING 155, 161 (Greg N. Gregoriou ed., 2015) (explaining the mechanics of spoofing);
Dina El Boghdady, Is High-Frequency Trading a Threat to Stock Trading, or a Boon?, WASH. POST (Oct. 25,
2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/is-high-frequency-trading-a-threat-to-stocktrading-or-a-boon/2012/10/25/9c39ff96-1865-11e2-a55c-39408fbe6a4b_story.html?tid=wp_ipad&utm_term=
.e5d92d4bf62f [https://perma.cc/Q4BX-GM9D] (“Computer programs try to bait institutional investors by
simultaneously placing millions of offers to see where they get a bite, then quickly canceling them . . . .”).
191 Massimiliano Marzo, Designing a Trading Market, in MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE IN EMERGING AND
DEVELOPED MARKETS 159, 171 (H. Kent Baker & Halil Kiymaz eds., 2013).
192 Press Release, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., FINRA Sanctions Trillium Brokerage Services, LLC,
Director of Trading, Chief Compliance Officer, and Nine Traders $2.26 Million for Illicit Equities Trading
Strategy (Sept. 13, 2010), http://www.finra.org/newsroom/2010/finra-sanctions-trillium-brokerage-services-llcdirector-trading-chief-compliance.
193 See supra Part I.A.2.
194 Carol Clark & Rajeev Ranjan, How Do Broker-Dealers/Futures Commission Merchants Control the
Risks of High Speed Trading? 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank Chi., Policy Discussion Paper No. 2012-3, 2012).
195 Id.; PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 62–63, 208–09.
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books.196 High-frequency and algorithmic trading platforms can execute these
schemes to gain fractions of a penny per trade to the tune of billions of dollars
in profits by taking advantage of unsuspecting investors with slower execution
speeds and other computerized traders with unsuspecting execution codes.197
There has been much recent debate and discussion among scholars and
regulators about tactics like pinging and spoofing in connection with the rise of
high-frequency trading and algorithmic systems in financial markets.198
Policymakers and regulators have taken many important early steps to better
understand and govern new manipulative tactics like pinging and spoofing.199 In
fact, the passage of the landmark Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (Dodd-Frank) expressly prohibited various disruptive and
manipulative practices like spoofing in financial markets.200 The efficacy of
these preliminary actions on pinging and spoofing remains to be seen as
unscrupulous market players continue to find new ways to manipulate the
marketplace.
2. Electronic Front Running
Electronic front running is both similar and dissimilar from its traditional
counterpart. Like its traditional counterpart, electronic front running seeks to
manipulate the marketplace by executing trades ahead of a known future price
change, thereby profiting once the price moving order is executed.201 Unlike its
traditional counterpart that front ran traders via human brokers in small batches,
electronic front running frequently leverages new, high-tech mechanisms that
allow brokers to gain an unfair glimpse into order flows at one trading venue
and to jump ahead of those flows to their advantage at another trading venue.202

196

See Surowiecki, supra note 46 (“A human trader would never be able to quickly synthesize all the
information in the order book, but a bot can.”).
197 LEWIS, supra note 8, at 45–46.
198 E.g., Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61358, 75 Fed. Reg.
3594, 3609 (Jan. 21, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242); Computerized Trading: What Should the Rules of the
Road Be?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban
Affairs, 112th Cong. 41–45 (2012) (statement of Andrew M. Brooks, Head of U.S. Equity Trading, T. Rowe
Price); Clark & Ranjan, supra note 194, at 3; Scopino, supra note 189, at 610–14.
199 See, e.g., supra Part II.B (surveying the early regulatory response).
200 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,943,
14,944 (Mar. 18, 2011) (describing the disruptive practices prohibited by the Dodd-Frank Act).
201 See Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 7, at 226–33 (discussing the mechanics and implications of
electronic front running).
202 LEWIS, supra note 8, at 45.
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New financial technology makes electronic front running possible. With new
financial technology, a party can view a price change or transaction in one venue
and race to execute an advantageous trade in another venue before the new price
is reflected in the second venue. New financial technology has also made it
possible for certain privileged parties to see order flows of other parties prior to
their execution via special feeds or through a process called flash orders.203 With
a flash order, an exchange or electronic trading platform will “flash” order
information to certain parties (usually those who pay a fee) prior to the
information being made widely available in the marketplace.204 The “flash” of
an order normally exists for fractions of a second prior to publication, but
because new financial technology can work in milliseconds, those given a quick
peek can make an even quicker profit.205 When the SEC permitted the practice
of “flashing” by an order in 1978, they did so during an era of human traders on
exchange floors and did not anticipate in the current era of autonomous, highspeed algorithmic programs trading in dark pools and electronic exchanges.206
In recent years, regulators and policymakers have examined flash orders and
electronic front running but have not banned the practice.207 The SEC proposed
a rule in 2009 to eliminate the practice of flash orders, but the rule was never
adopted.208 It has been contended that while flash orders present the risk of front
running and manipulation, they can also help enhance liquidity and reduce
transaction costs in the marketplace.209 While a general regulatory prohibition
has not been issued, a number of private exchanges like IEX have banned the
practice, while other exchanges continue to allow the practice.210

203 See TEALL, supra note 151, at 87; Yesha Yadav, Insider Trading and Market Structure, 63 UCLA L.
REV. 968, 998–99 (2016) (discussing the special data access and exploitation of certain high frequency traders
in the marketplace).
204 LEWIS, supra note 8, at 45.
205 THIERRY FOUCAULT, MARCO PAGANO & AILSA RÖELL, MARKET LIQUIDITY: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND
POLICY 212 (2013).
206 Fact Sheet: Banning Marketable Flash Orders, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Sept. 7, 2009),
https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-201-factsheet.htm.
207 See, e.g., Dark Pools, Flash Orders, High-Frequency Trading, and Other Market Structure Issues:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., and Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 111th
Cong. 1 (2009) (opening statement of Jack Reed, Chairman).
208 Elimination of Flash Order Exception from Rule 602 of Regulation NMS, Exchange Act Release No.
34-60684, 74 Fed. Reg. 48,632, 48,632 (Sept. 23, 2009).
209 See MARKHAM, supra note 137, at 323; TEALL, supra note 151, at 88.
210 See ALDRIDGE, supra note 187, at 211 (“At present, most exchanges have voluntarily banned flash
orders, yet some exchanges, such as DirectEdge, persist in flash order executions.”).
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3. Mass Misinformation
Unscrupulous parties can now leverage the mechanisms of new media
technology and new financial technology to disrupt and distort financial markets
on an unprecedented scale by disseminating bad data, fake news, and faulty
information into a marketplace that thrives on accurate information.211 This
Article terms this new method of cybernetic market manipulation, mass
misinformation. With mass misinformation schemes, parties can manipulate the
marketplace through fake regulatory filings, fictitious news reports, erroneous
data, and hacking.212 Because the new financial marketplace is so reliant on
interconnected information and communications systems, a distortion to one
source of information can have a large, volatile cascading effect on the greater
marketplace in the short run, and a confidence-jarring effect on the greater
marketplace in the long run.213 In fact, in 2016, the U.S. intelligence community
ranked cyber and technological attacks, including the use of false data to
manipulate artificial intelligence systems trading financial instruments, a leading
global threat.214 Furthermore, whereas traditional pump-and-dump schemes are
most effective with little known, illiquid securities, mass misinformation
schemes are most effective on well known, widely held securities because the
misinformation is relevant for so many parties.
A successful massive misinformation scheme for a widely held company like
Apple, Facebook, or General Electric could have a monetary impact measured
in the billions of dollars and affect a significant population of investors since
those companies make up large positions in retirement accounts. Furthermore,
unlike many other methods of market manipulation, mass misinformation can
be motivated by goals of personal profit as well as goals of non-profit disruption.
211 See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE
L.J. 711, 714 (2006) (discussing the importance of accurate information in securities market); Sabrina Tavernise,
As Fake News Spreads Lies, More Readers Shrug at the Truth, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/12/06/us/fake-news-partisan-republican-democrat.html [https://perma.cc/HN24-ZKY4].
212 See, e.g., BARRY VENGERIK ET AL., FIREEYE, HACKING THE STREET? FIN4 LIKELY PLAYING THE
MARKET 3 (2014), https://www.fireeye.com/content/dam/fireeye-www/global/en/current-threats/pdfs/rpt-fin4.
pdf.
213 See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 9–10 (highlighting the risks of “a vicious self-reinforcing feedback
loop” in the new high-speed, electronic financial marketplace); Hope, supra note 91; Story & Bowley, supra
note 112 (“It is also possible that stocks simply move faster today because of the quicker pace of news and
trading, and so drops and surges in prices that might have been spread over days in past times are now condensed
within hours.”).
214 James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S.
Intelligence Community, February 9, 2016, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/SASC_Unclassified_2016_
ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YY5-4PTN].
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Because of its dual motivations and its wide impact, mass misinformation may
emerge as the most damaging form of market manipulation in terms of market
value and investor confidence.
Episodes from recent history have exhibited the variety of ways mass
misinformation can manipulate the marketplace. In 2000, a tech-savvy college
student created and disseminated a fake press release online about an SEC
investigation into Emulex that resulted in the company’s stock falling from $104
to $43 per share, a loss of $2.2 billion in market value.215 In 2013, hackers
infiltrated the Associated Press’s Twitter account to falsely broadcast an attack
on the White House that temporarily erased $136 billion in market value when
automated programs traded on the bogus news.216 In 2014, it was revealed that
Russian hackers infiltrated the NASDAQ main computer system that manages
its trading data and process.217 That same year, a group of cyber criminals
dubbed as FIN4 hacked into the computer systems of Wall Street firms and other
American corporations with the goal of stealing market-moving information to
manipulate the global financial markets.218 In 2015, a man in Bulgaria submitted
fake takeover bids for Avon and Rocky Mountain Chocolate via the SEC’s
EDGAR electronic filing system to manipulate the stock prices of those
companies.219 Avon shares rose over 20% because of the false filing and were
temporarily halted from trading.220 Later in 2015, fraudsters created a fake
Bloomberg News website to tout a nonexistent takeover of Twitter.221 The fake
news report caused Twitter shares to increase by 7% before crashing after the
hoax was exposed.222 As noted earlier, in 2015, the DOJ also revealed charges
against a global syndicate of cybercriminals that used hacking and the
dissemination of false information to orchestrate massive pump-and-dump
schemes.223
215

MARC GOODMAN, FUTURE CRIMES 140–41 (2015).
Chozick & Perlroth, supra note 48.
217 See Michael Riley, How Russian Hackers Stole the Nasdaq, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 21,
2014, 4:11 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-17/how-russian-hackers-stole-the-nasdaq
[https://perma.cc/7ZUH-EBTW]; see also FIREEYE, APT28: A WINDOW INTO RUSSIA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE
OPERATIONS? 3–6 (2014).
218 See VENGERIK ET AL., supra note 212, at 3; Perlroth, supra note 3.
219 Goldstein, supra note 3.
220 Id.
221 Michael J. de la Merced & Matthew Goldstein, Twitter Shares Jump After Faked Bloomberg Report,
N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/business/dealbook/twitter-shares-jumpafter-fake-bloomberg-report.html [https://perma.cc/WJ99-G9AQ].
222 Id.
223 Massive Network Intrusions Press Release, supra note 4; see also Indictment, United States v. Shalon,
S1 15 Cr. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/file/792506/download; Indictment, United
216
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As financial markets become more sensitive to the confluence of new media
technology and new financial technology, mass misinformation schemes to
manipulate the marketplace will certainly become more prevalent. Financial
markets will likely witness more audacious and innovative schemes to disrupt
and distort the marketplace with bad data and false information in the coming
years.
IV. REGULATORY CHALLENGES
Technological change in financial markets frequently leads to regulatory
challenges, as old rules and laws become dull in the face of sharp, new financial
realities.224 The emergence of cybernetic market manipulation presents policy
and regulatory challenges related to resources, detection, and enforcement.225
A. Of Resources
One of the key regulatory challenges posed by cybernetic market
manipulation is a matter of resources. In particular, regulators may lack
sufficient resources to better combat the new high-tech schemes that distort the
marketplace.226 While private firms in pursuit of greater profits regularly invest
in new technology and better expertise to thrive in the new marketplace,
regulators lack similar funding impetus, and are frequently constrained by
political considerations.227 Furthermore, private firms also expend significant
States v. Murgio, 15 Cr. 769 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), http://www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/file/792511/download;
Goldstein & Stevenson, supra note 4.
224 See, e.g., Tara Bhupathi, Technology’s Latest Market Manipulator? High Frequency Trading: The
Strategies, Tools, Risks, and Responses, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 377, 377–78 (2010) (“Rapid technological
advances have . . . caus[ed] the legal world to either choose to judicially adapt old laws and policies to the new
digital situations or to legislatively create new doctrines to deal with unforeseen challenges.”).
225 See, e.g., Yadav, supra note 203, at 1030 (“Viewed through the lens of market infrastructure, it becomes
clear that conventional doctrine is poorly equipped to deal with the complexities of increasing innovation.”).
226 Timothy Lavin, Monsters in the Market, THE ATLANTIC (July/August 2010), https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/07/monsters-in-the-market/308122/ [https://perma.cc/874V-52QL].
227 See, e.g., Testimony on Budget and Management of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., & the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t-Sponsored
Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Robert Khuzami et al., Dirs., Sec.
Exch. Comm’n), http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2011/ts031011directors.htm (“Over the past decade, the
SEC has faced significant challenges in maintaining a staffing level and budget sufficient to carry out its core
mission. The SEC experienced three years of frozen or reduced budgets . . . that forced a reduction of 10 percent
of the agency’s staff. Similarly, the agency’s investments in new or enhanced IT systems declined about 50
percent . . . .”); Arthur Levitt Jr., Don’t Gut the S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/08/08/opinion/dont-gut-the-sec.html [https://perma.cc/J9TR-YE6B] (opining on the funding and political
constraints on the SEC); Mark Maremont & Deborah Solomon, Behind SEC’s Failings: Caution, Tight Budget,
’90s Exuberance, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 24, 2003, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
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resources to lobby policymakers for rules that favor their practices, while
regulators lack similar lobbying influence.228
The lack of sufficient resources can lead to a regulatory deficit in technology
and expertise to combat the surplus of cybernetic market manipulation schemes
in today’s complex, technologically advanced marketplace.229 In terms of
technology, regulators simply lack adequate resources to keep pace with private
actors in the new marketplace.230 While regulators have made strides in recent
years to upgrade their dated technological capabilities through initiatives like
MIDAS and NEAT, they still continue to lag in comparison to the technological
capabilities of private firms in the financial industry.231 For instance, it was
reported in 2017 that the CFTC lacked the resources to examine the daily trading
data that they are receiving from the CME Group, one of the leading futures and
commodities exchanges.232 As a result of the technological disparity, regulators
are frequently using twentieth-century tools to combat 21st-century misconduct
in the marketplace.233 In terms of expertise, due in part to the lack of resources,
regulators often lose many of their experts to private industry. Private firms are
willing and able to pay for expertise at annual rates measured in millions of

SB107223513870781900 [https://perma.cc/7SF8-ER98]; James B. Stewart, Common Sense; As a Watchdog
Starves, Wall St. Is Tossed a Bone, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/16/
business/budget-cuts-to-sec-reduce-its-effectiveness.html [https://perma.cc/WTY4-PCTU] (discussing the
small budgets of financial regulators like the SEC).
228 See JEFF CONNAUGHTON, THE PAYOFF: WHY WALL STREET ALWAYS WINS 113 (2012); ROBERT G.
KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS: HOW AMERICA’S ESSENTIAL INSTITUTION WORKS, AND HOW IT DOESN’T 127–41
(2013); Roberta S. Karmel, IOSCO’s Response to the Financial Crisis, 37 J. CORP. L. 849, 853 (2012) (“Where
regulated industries have so much power and influence over lawmakers, there is a lack of political will to engage
in vigorous regulation even when regulators perceive the dangers of insufficient market place standards.”);
Rebecca M. Kysar, The Sun Also Rises: The Political Economy of Sunset Provisions in the Tax Code, 40 GA. L.
REV. 335, 392 (2006) (“Through campaign contributions and lobbyists, these [interest] groups seek legislative
votes favorable to their interests from politicians.”); Eric Lipton & Ben Protess, Banks’ Lobbyists Help in
Drafting Financial Bills, N.Y. TIMES (May 23, 2013, 9:44 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/
banks-lobbyists-help-in-drafting-financial-bills/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Z7ET-Y3NH].
229 See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 230 (“The new hierarchy would be all about who owned the most
powerful computers, the fastest links between markets, the most sophisticated algorithms—and the inside
knowledge of how the market’s plumbing was put together.”).
230 See MARKHAM, supra note 137, at 406–07; Nathaniel Popper & Ben Protess, To Regulate Rapid Traders,
S.E.C. Turns to One of Them, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/business/secregulators-turn-to-high-speed-trading-firm.html [https://perma.cc/NS3C-YRPW].
231 See, e.g., supra Part II.B (discussing new technological advances at the SEC).
232 Matthew Leising, Hunting for Dirty Deeds in the $34 Trillion U.S. Futures Market, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Feb. 16, 2017, 2:11 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-16/hunting-fordirty-deeds-in-the-34-trillion-u-s-futures-market [https://perma.cc/66RU-DHBU].
233 See Patterson, supra note 122.
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dollars, while government regulators can only pay a fraction of that sum.234 As
a result of the expertise disparity, regulators may lack the latest knowledge to
fully understand all the new ways the marketplace can be manipulated.235
In sum, resource asymmetries that affect regulatory technology and expertise
present one of the critical challenges for regulators as they seek to combat the
new schemes of manipulation emerging in the marketplace.
B. Of Detection
The emerging modes of cybernetic market manipulation are particularly
challenging for resource-constrained regulators because they are incredibly
difficult to detect due to the accelerated speed, data deluge, and balkanization of
the marketplace.236
First, the unprecedented speed of many of today’s transactions and trades
makes it especially tough for regulators to pinpoint ongoing market
manipulation schemes. Powered by autonomous supercomputers linked to highspeed communication networks, trillions of dollars worth of trades and
transactions occur at speeds measured in milliseconds.237 As such, significant
movements in market prices can last for merely milliseconds.238 Today, highfrequency trading accounts—for trade volumes and dollar values—measure in
the hundreds of billions daily.239 In recent years, high-frequency trading has
accounted for 30% of all foreign-exchange transactions, 35% to 40% of all

234 See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-654, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION: EXISTING POST-EMPLOYMENT CONTROLS COULD BE FURTHER STRENGTHENED (2011),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11654.pdf (studying the revolving door between the SEC and the private
sector); MICHAEL SMALLBERG, DANGEROUS LIAISONS: REVOLVING DOOR AT SEC CREATES RISK OF
REGULATORY CAPTURE (2013), http://pogoarchives.org/ebooks/20130211-dangerous-liaisons-sec-revolvingdoor.pdf; JAMES Q. WILSON & JOHN J. DILULIO, JR., AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES 278
(11th ed. 2008) (“Every year, hundreds of people leave important jobs in the federal government to take more
lucrative positions in private industry.”).
235 PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 230.
236 For a general discussion of the historical development of the U.S. financial marketplace, see DeYoung,
supra note 85, at 41; Mester, supra note 85, at 67–72; Scopino, supra note 84, at 223–25; Wilmarth, supra note
85.
237 Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 104, at 8–10.
238 NEIL JOHNSON ET AL., SCI. REPORTS 3: 2627 DOI: 10.1038/SREP02627, ABRUPT RISE OF NEW MACHINE
ECOLOGY BEYOND HUMAN RESPONSE TIME (2013).
239 See Korsmo, supra note 7, at 541–42; Eric Dash & Christine Hauser, As Dizzying Week Ends on Wall
St., Dangers Linger, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/13/business/daily-stockmarket-activity.html [https://perma.cc/M5AQ-SMU4].
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European equity trading, and 60% of all U.S. equity trading.240 This emphasis
on speed in the marketplace has conferred a competitive advantage to private
firms with the resources to attain better technology and better real estate to
reduce their latency periods and enhance their execution speeds.241
Despite recent moves to upgrade their technological capabilities, financial
regulators still lack the wherewithal to keep up with private firms in a
marketplace that is constantly moving larger and larger volumes faster and
faster.242 It has been estimated that the average investment period for equities in
the United States alone has shortened dramatically from years to months to
seconds in the last few decades.243 Given the astonishing velocity and volume of
the marketplace, regulators currently lack the ability to meaningfully monitor in
real-time every trade and transaction to detect suspicious, manipulative
activities. Rather than ex ante detection and prevention of cybernetic market
manipulation schemes, regulators have focused on ex post investigations of
voluminous trading data to discern market manipulation.244 As financial
technology continues to accelerate, detection of cybernetic market manipulation
schemes will grow even more challenging for regulators.
Second, the increasing influence of digital data and information has made
detecting the new methods of market manipulation much more challenging for
regulators.245 Today’s financial marketplace is more data driven and more data
sensitive than ever before. An ordinary trading day in the American capital
markets can generate over a trillion bytes of data.246 Algorithmic computer
programs processing deluges of data are behind many financial transactions in
240 See, e.g., Bowley, supra note 55; Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 104, at 8; Neil Shah, High-Speed
Traders Dive into Forex Despite Doubts, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 25, 2011, 11:59 AM), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SB10001424052748704677404576284921020282968.html [https://perma.cc/P3ZF-J4TA].
241 See Concept Release on Equity Market Structure, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61358, 75 Fed. Reg.
3594, 3610 (Jan. 21, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242) (discussing the importance of co-located real estate
and financial technology in the marketplace); BROWN, supra note 57, at 63 (explaining how real estate and
technology affect financial execution speed).
242 See David Schneider, Trading at the Speed of Light, IEEE SPECTRUM, Oct. 2011, at 11, 11–12; WissnerGross & Freer, supra note 120 (studying arbitrage opportunities as trading nears the speed of light).
243 PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 46 (“At the end of World War II, the average holding period for a stock
was four years. By 2000, it was eight months. By 2008, it was two months. And by 2011 it was twenty-two
seconds . . . .”).
244 Philips & Brush, supra note 134.
245 See, e.g., Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms, 100
MINN. L. REV. 1323, 1351 (2016) (discussing similar difficulties posed by algorithmic programs for antitrust
law).
246 Enough Already!, NANEX, http://www.nanex.net/Research/Emini2/EMini2.html (last updated Apr. 2,
2012).
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today’s marketplace.247 These programs can be designed to analyze mountains
of data, identify valuable opportunities, and invest accordingly without any
human assistance.248 Because the marketplace is becoming increasingly more
sensitive to data, there arises greater opportunities for bad actors to manipulate
the marketplace by distorting data or disseminating bad information through
countless mediums.
Despite significant improvements in their information-technology
capabilities, financial regulators remain lacking in their capabilities to better
detect cybernetic market manipulation schemes in the face of the data revolution
within the financial marketplace, and more broadly in the greater economy.249
In 2013, it was reported that 90% of the world’s data at that time was generated
in the previous two years.250 It has also been estimated that the overwhelming
amount of the world’s information is now stored digitally.251 Furthermore,
algorithmic programs are learning to process a wider variety and volume of data
year after year. Market-moving data need not only mean financial information,
but it can also mean social media data, mapping data, consumer data, and other
types of information not traditionally considered relevant to finance.252 As more
and more digital data becomes available for algorithmic programs that serve as
the engines of the marketplace, regulators lacking in adequate technology will
be further challenged with attempts to manipulate financial markets via digital
data distortions.
247

See, e.g., ROBERT A. G. MONKS & ALEXANDRA REED LAJOUX, CORPORATE VALUATION FOR PORTFOLIO
INVESTMENT: ANALYZING ASSETS, EARNINGS, CASH FLOW, STOCK PRICE, GOVERNANCE, AND SPECIAL
SITUATIONS 229 (2011); FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 88, at 44.
248 See Concept Release on Risk Controls and System Safeguards for Automated Trading Environments,
78 Fed. Reg. 56,542, 56,573 app. 2 (Sept. 12, 2013) (“Automated trading systems, including high frequency
traders, enter the market and execute trades in a matter of milliseconds without human involvement.”); Charles
Duhigg, Stock Traders Find Speed Pays, in Milliseconds, N.Y. TIMES (July 23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.
com/2009/07/24/business/24trading.html [https://perma.cc/J4A8-36QH] (“[Algorithmic computer programs]
can spot trends before other investors can blink, changing orders and strategies within milliseconds.”).
249 Cf. VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA: A REVOLUTION THAT WILL
TRANSFORM HOW WE LIVE, WORK, AND THINK 6–10 (2013); NATE SILVER, THE SIGNAL AND THE NOISE: WHY
SO MANY PREDICTIONS FAIL—BUT SOME DON’T 9–10 (2012); Andrew McAfee & Erik Brynjolfsson, Big Data:
The Management Revolution, HARV. BUS. REV. 61, 62–68 (2012).
250 Åse Dragland, Big Data, For Better or Worse: 90% of World’s Data Generated over Last Two Years,
SCIENCEDAILY (May 22, 2013), www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130522085217.htm.
251 See Don Peck, They’re Watching You at Work, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 2013), https://www.
theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2013/12/theyre-watching-you-at-work/354681/
[https://perma.cc/2P8WTCNY] (“[M]ore than 98 percent of the world’s information is now stored digitally, and the volume of that data
has quadrupled since 2007.”).
252 See ROBERT S. KRICHEFF, DATA ANALYTICS FOR CORPORATE DEBT MARKETS: USING DATA FOR
INVESTING, TRADING, CAPITAL MARKETS, AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 55–60 (2014); FRANK OHLHORST,
BIG DATA ANALYTICS: TURNING BIG DATA INTO BIG MONEY 37–46 (2013).
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Third, in addition to the increases of market speed and market data, the
increasing balkanization of the marketplace will make it more difficult for
regulators to detect new modes of cybernetic market manipulation as there are
more forums for market mischief. Traditional dominant financial forums such
as public stock exchanges like the New York Stock Exchange and the NASDAQ
are less relevant in today’s fragmented financial marketplace.253 When the New
York Stock Exchange halted trading for several hours in July of 2015, the equity
markets continued to function without any serious disruption since so much of
the market activity already takes place in alternative trading venues.254 In other
eras, a failure of the New York Stock Exchange would have brought a majority
of equity trading in the United States to a halt.255 In today’s fragmented
marketplace, that is no longer the case. In 2016, there were over twenty
registered national exchanges and around seventy total trading venues for
securities and futures trading.256 Additionally, more and more market activities
are taking place in private electronic venues called “dark pools.”257 In fact, most
equities in the United States, including those listed on the NASDAQ and the
New York Stock Exchange are traded in dark pools instead of the public
exchanges.258 Dark pools are regulated differently than registered exchanges,
253 See Langevoort & Thompson, supra note 7, at 347 (“Today, liquidity is now much more possible outside
of traditional exchanges. In the new millennium, cheap information and low communication costs have expanded
markets . . . .”); Michael J. de la Merced, An Offline N.Y.S.E. Makes Barely a Ripple in a Day’s Trading, N.Y.
TIMES (July 8, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/business/dealbook/an-offline-nyse-makes-barelya-ripple-in-a-days-trading.html [https://perma.cc/V6QA-PFYH] (“Investors, however, need not rely on
traditional exchanges to trade their shares at all. . . . Now, many Wall Street firms execute trades within their
own systems.”).
254 de la Merced, supra note 253.
255 Id.
256 Michael MacKenzie, Kara Scannell & Nicole Bullock, Share Trades: Murky Pools, FIN. TIMES (June
27, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/a22603c4-fde1-11e3-acf8-00144feab7de [https://perma.cc/XAE3BUVC] (reporting that “there are 70 trading venues in the US, including 40 dark pools”); Fast Answers, U.S.
SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrexchanges.shtml (last modified
Aug. 30, 2012).
257 See Regulation of Non-Public Trading Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-60997, 97 SEC Docket
472, 473 (June 28, 2010) (“Such trading interest is considered non-public, or ‘dark,’ primarily because it is not
included in the consolidated quotation data for NMS stocks that is widely disseminated to the public.”); SAL
ARNUK & JOSEPH SALUZZI, BROKEN MARKETS: HOW HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING AND PREDATORY PRACTICES
ON WALL STREET ARE DESTROYING INVESTOR CONFIDENCE AND YOUR PORTFOLIO 62 (2012) (“The number of
dark pools and ATSs has also skyrocketed over the past decade. Today, nearly one in every three shares trades
off-exchange. There are currently approximately 40 such dark pools, where stocks trade without their orders
displayed to the public.”); Philips, supra note 56; Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n,
Statement on Dark Pool Regulation Before the Commission Open Meeting (Oct. 21, 2009) (transcript available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch102109mls.htm).
258 See Nathaniel Popper, Public Exchanges Duel with Newcomers over Trade Transparency, N.Y. TIMES
(June 26, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/27/business/stock-exchanges-duel-with-newcomers-over-
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and can also facilitate complex financial arrangements in relatively less liquid
instruments with relatively less regulation, compared to traditional trading
forums.259 As a result of these dynamics, dark pools can be ripe for manipulative
and fraudulent behavior. In 2016, for instance, Barclays and Credit Suisse agreed
to pay a combined $154.3 million for wrongdoing in connection with their
respective dark pools.260
Despite new powers since the last financial crisis, regulators still lack the
resources and tools to timely detect market manipulation in this increasingly
balkanized global marketplace.261 As the marketplace grows more and more
fragmented, regulators will be further challenged in their efforts to detect and
deter the new methods of market manipulation.
In sum, it will be challenging for regulators to detect and deter the new forms
of cybernetic market manipulation because they lack the resources and
technology to smartly monitor a marketplace of increasingly accelerated speed,
massive volumes of data, and balkanized intermediaries. Without the proper
resources and tools, asking regulators to detect and prevent new schemes of
market manipulation is akin to asking them to find particular grains of sand
during a sandstorm in the desert while partially blindfolded.
C. Of Enforcement
In addition to the regulatory challenges relating to resources and detection,
the new modes of market manipulation also present enforcement challenges for
regulators because longstanding laws against market manipulation are not well
suited to address the new cybernetic methods of distorting and disrupting the
marketplace.262 In particular, laws have historically focused on schemes

trade-transparency.html [https://perma.cc/CFE9-R2UA]; Nelson D. Schwartz & Louise Story, Surge of
Computer Selling After Apparent Glitch Sends Stocks Plunging, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.
com/2010/05/07/business/economy/07trade.html [https://perma.cc/44EX-6VAY].
259 See Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadow Banking, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 619, 627–28 (2012).
260 Liz Moyer, Barclays and Credit Suisse to Settle ‘Dark Pool’ Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/01/business/dealbook/barclays-and-credit-suisse-to-settle-dark-poolinquiries.html [https://perma.cc/7HAL-CTKF].
261 For instance, pursuant to Dodd-Frank, regulators were granted powers to monitor disruptive practices in
the marketplace, but the full practical implementation of those powers remain forthcoming. See Antidisruptive
Practices Authority, 76 Fed. Reg. 14,943, 14,944 (Mar. 18, 2011).
262 See MARKHAM, supra note 137, at 390–91; Scopino, supra note 84, at 222 (“Today, federal regulators
are faced with a very different and yet in some ways similar task: monitoring the actions of artificially-intelligent
algorithmic trading robots—frequently referred to as ‘algo bots’—in a continuous effort to combat price
manipulation and disruptive trading practices in the markets . . . .”); Yesha Yadav, The Failure of Liability in
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effectuated by human actors with the ill intent to manipulate the markets and not
on schemes that largely utilize autonomous computerized systems.263 While one
could attempt to retrofit the traditional legal understandings to the new financial
reality, it is difficult to claim that laws that focus on natural legal persons should
naturally and seamlessly apply to autonomous, artificially intelligent systems.264
Like many forms of market misconduct, scienter, or intent, has long been a
critical component of market manipulation violations pursuant to either the
Commodities Exchange Act or the Securities Exchange Act.265 In fact, a 1984
joint report by the CFTC, Federal Reserve, and SEC stated that the element of
intent was essential to all market manipulation claims.266 Whereas in eras past,
regulators could establish the element of intent by the testimony of coconspirators in a scheme, establishing intent becomes more difficult when the
critical entity of an alleged scheme is an autonomous, algorithmic program that
uses artificial intelligence with little to no human input after initial
installation.267
Further complicating the enforcement issue for regulators is the fact that in
the absence of the requisite ill intent to manipulate the marketplace, some of the
cybernetic tactics are arguably legitimate trading and investment strategies that
cannot be easily distinguished from the tactics of illegal market manipulators.268

Modern Markets, 106 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1034–39 (2016) (discussing how traditional securities liability regimes
are losing relevance in the modern marketplace).
263 See, e.g., MARKHAM, supra note 137, at 400–06; Scopino, supra note 84, at 250 (“[S]cienter—or a
culpable mental state—is a required element of the majority of civil claims involving manipulation, abusive
market practices, or financial fraud. Only humans and business entities are considered ‘persons’ for purposes of
the law. Noticeably, that leaves out computers and software programs . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
264 See, e.g., SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL
AGENTS 153–63 (2011); Lawrence B. Solum, Legal Personhood for Artificial Intelligences, 70 N.C. L. REV.
1231, 1231–33 (1992).
265 See MARKHAM, supra note 137, at 375–76 (explaining the importance of scienter in market manipulation
claims); Scopino, supra note 84, at 233 (“Many causes of action under the CEA require proof that a human
involved with the improper activity acted with a culpable mental state.”); Yadav, supra note 262, at 1053 (“The
hallmark of actions to pursue fraud and manipulation lies in the requirement to show that defendants intended
to lie or to deliberately alter prices in securities markets.”).
266 See Board of Gov. of Fed. Res., et al., Study of the Effects on the Economy of Trading in Futures and
Options Pursuant to Section 23(a) of the Commodity Exchange Act as Amended VII–3 (Dec. 1984); MARKHAM,
supra note 137, at 375 (highlighting the 1984 joint report’s acknowledgment of intent as a core market
manipulation element),
267 See Scopino, supra note 84, at 233 (“[C]auses of action [requiring scienter] would be ineffective in
circumstances where computerized trading bots, without specific human direction, engaged in disruptive trading
conduct while continuously modifying their own algorithms . . . .”).
268 See Verstein, supra note 174, at 272 (“Defining ‘manipulation’ has proven a perennial difficulty among
scholars of manipulation . . . .”); see also Ledgerwood & Carpenter, supra note 10, at 260 (discussing the
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For instance, pinging and spoofing without the requisite intent to manipulate the
market are considered by many to be legitimate strategies used by many traders
and algorithmic trading programs to conceal their true motivations from the
marketplace.269 In fact, it has long been debated by scholars whether many forms
of market manipulation should be regulated at all because they are difficult to
identify and may be corrected by market forces in the absence of regulation.270
While regulators could attempt to directly enforce traditional laws against
the new methods of manipulation or use new powers under Dodd-Frank and
other new grants of authority, they will be lacking in meaningful precedent in
the near term, particularly on the issue of scienter.271 This does not mean to
suggest that existing antifraud and anti-manipulation regulation and laws cannot
be adapted to the new financial realities of the marketplace, just that they have
not yet been so adopted. Powerful rules like the SEC’s bedrock Rule 10b-5272
and the CFTC’s newer Rule 180.1273 may ultimately catch up to new market
realities.274 In the meantime, regulators can use rules like the Market Access
difficulties of enforcing anti-manipulation statutes); Tara E. Levens, Comment, Too Fast, Too Frequent? High
Frequency Trading and Security Class Actions, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (2015) (explaining how certain
legitimate trading programs and patterns may appear similar to manipulative schemes).
269 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Manipulation, and the Regulation of Futures Markets, 59 J.
BUS. S103, S118 (1986) (suggesting the concealing of one’s true motivations in a trade does not necessarily
amount to market manipulation); Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The
Unprosecutable Crime, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 281, 356–57 (1991) (opining on the heavy burden of proof to
establish specific intent to manipulate market prices).
270 See Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Stock-Price Manipulation, 5 REV. FIN. STUD. 503, 506 (1992)
(opining that natural market forces of supply and demand make stock market manipulation self-defeating);
Daniel R. Fischel & David J. Ross, Should the Law Prohibit “Manipulation” in Financial Markets?, 105 HARV.
L. REV. 503, 544 (1991) (arguing that noncompetitive manipulative trades should not be prohibited as a matter
of law); Merritt B. Fox, Lawrence R. Glosten & Paul C. Tetlock, Short Selling and the News: A Preliminary
Report on an Empirical Study, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 645, 653 (2009–2010) (“[P]ure manipulations cannot be
expected to yield much profit, if any, because the purchase orders needed to effect a cover will push prices up
just as the sale orders prompted by the original short sale pushed them down.”); Albert S. Kyle & S.
Viswanathan, How to Define Illegal Price Manipulation, 98 AM. ECON. REV. 274, 274 (2008) (advocating for a
narrower definition of illegal market manipulation); Steve Thel, $850,000 in Six Minutes—The Mechanics of
Securities Manipulation, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 219, 261 (1994) (suggesting that certain trade orient forms of
manipulation are “self-deterring”).
271 See Antidisruptive Practices Authority, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,890, 31,895 (May 28, 2013) (stating that the
CFTC will use securities law precedents for certain market manipulation claims given the dearth of precedents
relating to the commodities and futures markets); MARKHAM, supra note 137, at 397 (highlighting the difficulties
in utilizing new grants of power under Dodd-Frank absent statutory clarity and meaningful precedents).
272 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
273 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2017).
274 See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (comparing Rule 10b-5 to
“a judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn”); John C. Coffee, Jr., Introduction:
Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV.
281, 317 (“Rule 10b-5 was intended to evolve to keep pace with the ingenuity of fraudsters.”); Scopino, supra
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Rule that require proper supervision to indirectly combat the new schemes of
market manipulation while sidestepping the thorny issue of scienter.275
Nevertheless, until new precedents, principles, and rules are firmly established,
there will be significant enforcement challenges for regulators as they combat
the new methods of market manipulation.276
V. IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The emergence of cybernetic market manipulation in the new high-tech
financial marketplace will have numerous implications for institutions,
regulators, and investors. While a consensus in the debates concerning the larger
regulatory questions about the new modes of market manipulation remains
forthcoming, there are, nevertheless, preliminary steps that can be taken to
address the looming implications confronting institutions, regulators, and
investors. In particular, near term action can be taken to enhance the integrity of
financial intermediaries, improve financial cybersecurity, and safeguard the
investments of ordinary investors.
A. Intermediary Integrity
One of the key implications from the emergence of cybernetic market
manipulation methods will be greater effort from financial intermediaries to
safeguard the sanctity of the marketplace from tampering and distortion since
regulators face serious resource constraints.277 As such, policymakers should
embrace an organizing principle that this Article terms intermediary integrity to
help guide intermediaries towards developing best practices to protect the
marketplace from the threats of manipulation.
note 189, at 686–90 (arguing for possible application of existing law against new forms of market manipulation
like pinging and electronic front running).
275 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2012) (mandating “reasonabl[e] supervis[ion]” of broker-dealers);
In re FXDirectDealer, LLC, CFTC No. 13-34, 2013 WL 11069513, at *1 (Sept. 18, 2013); In re Forex Capital
Mkts., LLC, CFTC No. 12-01, 2011 WL 4689390, at *1 (Oct. 3, 2011); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3–5 (2017); 17
C.F.R. § 166.3 (2017) (requiring diligent supervision in the commodities marketplace); Scopino, supra note 84,
at 284 (“[T]he CFTC already has brought cases asserting Regulation 166.3 violations in which registrants’
employees failed to diligently supervise employees who were responsible for programming, overseeing, or
controlling their electronic trading platforms.”).
276 Jonathan Mayer, Cybercrime Litigation, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1505–07 (2016).
277 See Gregory Scopino, Preparing Financial Regulation for the Second Machine Age: The Need for
Oversight of Digital Intermediaries in the Futures Market, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 439, 518–19 (advocating
for greater regulatory attention on emerging financial “digital intermediaries”); see also Jonathan Zittrain, A
History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 253, 253–54 (2006) (making a similar argument in the
context of online activities).
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Financial intermediaries must serve as stronger sentinels against market
manipulation because attempts at manipulation frequently happen at the
intermediary level, and not at the market level.278 The financial marketplace is
truly a market of intermediaries of various types and sizes.279 Intermediation is
an existential fact of modern finance.280 Investment banks, commercial banks,
mutual funds, stock exchanges, clearinghouses, brokerages, and other
intermediaries form the modern financial infrastructure.281 Because financial
intermediaries serve as the locus of market activity, they also serve as the locus
of market manipulation. For instance, if one endeavored to manipulate the stock
price of Alphabet, Google’s parent company, one would likely attempt to
manipulate the mechanisms of a stock exchange or trading platform that deals
in the company’s shares, not the entire market for Alphabet stock itself.
Manipulating the entire market for Alphabet stock through direct, actual trading
is extremely difficult because the market capitalization for Alphabet stock was
valued at around $550 billion at one point in 2016, so one would need substantial
purchasing power and would endure significant costs to move the stock in a
meaningful way.282 Instead of manipulating the market for Alphabet shares, one
could manipulate the trading of those shares on a particular dark pool or
exchange during a very short period of time using various methods like spoofing,
electronic front running, or wash trading. As such, financial intermediaries serve
as key arenas for market manipulation.
To better combat market manipulation that frequently originates at the
intermediary level, policymakers should adopt the organizing principle of
intermediary integrity. This principle, as introduced here, advocates for
intermediary practices that favor private supervision, investor neutrality,
enhanced security, and fair access in its conduct with counterparties and other
market participants. This principle, in practice, would disfavor conduct that
278

See Yadav, supra note 262, at 1090–94 (advocating for empowering exchanges to better help regulate
financial markets).
279 Tom C.W. Lin, Infinite Financial Intermediation, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 643, 661 (2015).
280 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Winton, Financial Intermediation, in 1A HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS
OF FINANCE: CORPORATE FINANCE 431, 433 (George M. Constantinides, Milton Harris & René M. Stulz eds.,
2003) (“Financial intermediation is a pervasive feature of all of the world’s economies.”); Kathryn Judge,
Intermediary Influence, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 614–24 (2015) (discussing the influential role of financial
intermediaries in the marketplace).
281 See BENTON E. GUP, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A GUIDE FOR DIRECTORS, INVESTORS,
AND COUNTERPARTIES 23–24 (2011) (defining the essential roles of financial intermediation in modern finance).
282 See Jonathan Taplin, Forget AT&T. The Real Monopolies Are Google and Facebook, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
13,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/opinion/forget-att-the-real-monopolies-are-google-andfacebook.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/55NU-Q5V5]; Verstein, supra note 174, at 220 (“[M]anipulative trading
entails substantial costs and risks for the manipulator.”).
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grants certain market participants special access to the order flows of other
participants, permits unfair execution of trades, or allows relaxed security
protocols for certain market participants. This principle, in practice, would also
encourage intermediaries to adopt new technologies to combat market
manipulation within their respective purviews, which can facilitate competitive
private ordering solutions to better address the emerging dangers of cybernetic
market manipulation.
The fact that this principle emphasizes regulation at the intermediary level to
combat a new mode of market manipulation, which empowers private regulators
and entities, is not a radical departure from existing practice since exchanges and
self-regulating organizations have historically played important regulatory roles
in the financial marketplace.283 Financial regulators already require reasonable
and diligent supervision by financial intermediaries.284 Moreover, in response to
new threats and new regulation in the marketplace, many financial firms already
invest substantial resources in compliance, technology, and cybersecurity.285 As
such, rather than a radical deviation from existing practice, this principle
empowers and updates the existing practice to minimize regulatory disruption to
the financial markets.
The legal principle of financial intermediary integrity has similar, though not
symmetrical, counterparts in the analog world of traditional banking and the
digital world of cyberspace. First, the principle of intermediary integrity is akin
to the principle of fair lending from the analog world of traditional banking.
Similar to how the principle of fair lending seeks to ensure equitable access for
all parties when dealing with banking institutions,286 the principle of
intermediary integrity seeks to ensure honest conduct by market participants
who transact via a financial intermediary. Second, the principle of intermediary
integrity also has parallels with the principle of net neutrality from the digital
world of cyberspace.287 Just as the principle of net neutrality seeks to safeguard
283 See Birdthistle & Henderson, supra note 132, at 12–24; Karmel, supra note 132, at 151–55; see also
Rory Van Loo, Rise of the Digital Regulator, 66 DUKE L.J. 1267, 1318–19 (2017) (discussing how private
intermediaries can serve as important regulators in more digitized marketplace).
284 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (2012) (requiring reasonable supervision of broker-dealers); 17
C.F.R. § 166.3 (2017) (“Each . . . registrant, except an associated person who has no supervisory duties, must
diligently supervise the handling by its partners, officers, employees and agents . . . .”).
285 Tom C.W. Lin, Compliance; Technology; and Modern Finance, 11 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
159, 164–68, 177–78 (2016).
286 See COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK: FAIR LENDING 3–7 (2010)
(cataloging federal fair lending laws and regulations).
287 See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 202 n.* (2010) (“The
ideal of neutrality bespeaks a network that treats all it carries equally, indifferent to the nature of the content or
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fair entry and fair play on the Internet, the principle of intermediary integrity
seeks to safeguard the credibility and reliability of financial markets.
The principle of intermediary integrity, as introduced here, is a preliminary
proposal that is meant to serve as an early organizing concept for policymakers
as they confront the challenges posed by new modes of market manipulation
with new rules, regulations, and guidance. Policymakers and regulators should
work with key market stakeholders to develop detailed rules and guidelines
using the principle as a North Star to address the complexities surrounding
market manipulation.288 It is understood that much of the difficulties of
addressing market manipulation lie in the actual drafting, passage,
implementation, execution, and enforcement of new rules and regulations.
Nevertheless, the organizing principle of intermediary integrity can serve as an
important guidepost for creating a better regulatory framework to combat the
new forms market manipulation.
B. Financial Cybersecurity
The emergence of cybernetic market manipulation would result in greater
and more urgent emphasis on financial cybersecurity, since the new methods of
manipulation frequently leverage cyber means for devious ends. For instance,
many pernicious schemes of mass misinformation manipulation are hatched and
launched in cyberspace.289 Furthermore, because much of today’s financial
marketplace operates on a linked, privately held cyberspace infrastructure,
policymakers and regulators should design policies that encourage financial
institutions to improve their cybersecurity in a timelier manner.290
The modern financial marketplace is truly a high-tech marketplace where
many of the key operations and transactions occur in electronic networks of
cyberspace.291 As such, attempts at disrupting and manipulating the marketplace
often happen in cyberspace by authorized and unauthorized parties.292 The
marketplace has suffered through multiple attempts at market manipulation by
the identity of the user . . . [t]he neutrality principle holds that the big decisions concerns how to use the medium
are best left to the ‘ends’ of the network, not the carriers of information.”).
288 See Thel, supra note 270, at 280 (encouraging cautious legal interventions for the complex problems
associated with market manipulation).
289 See supra Part III.B.3.
290 See Kristen E. Eichensehr, The Cyber-Law of Nations, 103 GEO. L.J. 317, 350–51 (2015) (“[P]rivate
parties own the majority of the underlying infrastructure that supports the cyber domain.”).
291 See, e.g., PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 8–10.
292 See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Financial Weapons of War, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1405–08 (2016)
(highlighting the threats of “cyber financial weapons”).
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foreign states and cyber criminals in the last few years alone.293 For instance, a
massive global cyberattack using ransomware in the spring of 2017 affected
thousands of organizations and businesses around the world including financial
institutions and securities markets in China.294 To combat these disruptive
actions and the new modes of market manipulation, greater emphasis needs to
be placed on financial cybersecurity.295 Because much of the technological
infrastructure of the financial marketplace is linked, privately held and operated,
policymakers, regulators, and private firms all need to work better in a concerted
fashion to enhance financial cybersecurity and guard against cybernetic market
manipulation.296 Good cybersecurity requires that all firms and counterparties in
the marketplace have strong cybersecurity safeguards in place. It is simply not
enough for a firm to have strong cybersecurity capabilities while its
counterparties and vendors are vulnerable.
Recent efforts like the jointly proposed improved cybersecurity standards
from the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, would help move to enhance
cybersecurity in the financial marketplace.297 Additionally, regulatory
innovations like the National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance—established
by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to marshal government resources and
expertise with those of the private sector to combat the cybersecurity threats—
293 See VENGERIK ET AL., supra note 212, at 3; Nicole Perlroth & Quentin Hardy, Bank Hacking Was the
Work of Iranians, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/09/technology/
online-banking-attacks-were-work-of-iran-us-officials-say.html [https://perma.cc/7TK3-A3BK]; Riley, supra
note 217, at 40; David E. Sanger, David Barboza & Nicole Perlroth, Chinese Army Unit Is Seen as Tied to
Hacking Against U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinasarmy-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html [https://perma.cc/4TLA-6WYG].
294 Gerry Mullany & Paul Mozur, Cyberattacks Spreads in Asia; Thousands of Groups Affected, N.Y. TIMES
(May 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/15/world/asia/china-cyberattack-hack-ransomware.
html [https://perma.cc/75Y9-MFPW].
295 See Sarah Bloom Raskin, Deputy Sec’y U.S. Dep’t Treasury, Remarks at the Harvard Law School Forum
on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation: Protecting Financial Cyberspace (Dec. 16, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/12/16/protecting-financial-cyberspace/.
296 See, e.g., SHANE HARRIS, @WAR: THE RISE OF THE MILITARY-INTERNET COMPLEX xxii (2014)
(“Defending computer networks, and launching attacks on them, requires the participation, willing or otherwise,
of the private sector.”); Nathan Alexander Sales, Regulating Cyber-Security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1550–
52 (2013) (discussing the use of carrots and sticks to improve cybersecurity); Bruce P. Smith, Hacking,
Poaching, and Counterattacking: Digital Counterstrikes and the Contours of Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y
171, 173 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Cyber Espionage or Cyberwar?: International Law, Domestic Law, and
Self-Protective Measures, in CYBERWAR: LAW & ETHICS FOR VIRTUAL CONFLICTS 175, 192–93 (Jens David
Ohlin, Kevin Govern & Claire Finkelstein eds., 2015) (highlighting the need for “improved software
engineering”).
297 Dept. of Treasury, Office of the Comptroller et al., Enhanced Cyber Risk Management Standards (Oct.
19, 2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20161019a1.pdf.
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serve as a good model for future joint efforts between the public and private
sectors.298
Thoughtful government actions in cybersecurity is needed as a pure marketbased approach may be inadequate because private firms are frequently
motivated by profit-making and expense reduction and lack proper incentives to
invest and upgrade their cybersecurity capabilities in a proactive, timely
manner.299 While some firms have been making significant investments in
cybersecurity, many have not.300 Furthermore, to the extent improvements are
made, they are often done in a reactionary, firm-by-firm manner following some
major security breach—in other words, in response to the last threat and not the
next threat. 301 Therefore, public policy will need to be better leveraged to
provide stronger incentives to address the market’s shortcomings related to
financial cybersecurity, and to encourage further innovation in emerging
technologies, like blockchains, to better protect the marketplace.302

298 See NATIONAL CYBER-FORENSICS & TRAINING ALLIANCE, https://www.ncfta.net/ (last visited Jan. 27,
2017); Nicole Hong, Private-Public Collaboration Puts Pittsburgh at Fore of Cybercrime Fight, WALL ST. J.
(Aug. 13, 2015, 7:30 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/private-public-collaboration-puts-pittsburgh-at-fore-ofcybercrime-fight-1439508624 [https://perma.cc/B9SP-8C9U].
299 See, e.g., STEWART BAKER, SHAUN WATERMAN & GEORGE IVANOV, MCAFEE, IN THE CROSSFIRE:
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AGE OF CYBER WAR 14 (2010); NY STATE DEPT. OF FIN. SERVS., REPORT
ON CYBER SECURITY IN THE BANKING SECTOR 11 (2014) (highlighting resource constraints and stale software
as ongoing challenges for financial cybersecurity); Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L.
REV. 1011, 1036 (2014) (“Rational vendors will accordingly skimp on security investments, at least at the
margins, since they will likely not be able to recover those costs via higher prices that correlate with higher
quality.”); Nicole Perlroth, Hacked vs. Hackers: Game On, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2014, 9:31 PM), https://bits.
blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/02/hacked-vs-hackers-game-on/?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=9AFA0DE127E
6E327C29F32D15D18F29D&gwt=pay&assetType=nyt_now [https://perma.cc/S4YB-R7A6] (reporting on the
lack of urgency regarding cybersecurity).
300 See, e.g., JOEL BRENNER, AMERICA THE VULNERABLE: INSIDE THE NEW THREAT MATRIX OF DIGITAL
ESPIONAGE, CRIME, AND WARFARE 239 (2011) (discussing the underinvestment in cybersecurity by American
businesses); JPMORGAN CHASE & CO., ANNUAL REPORT 2014, at 142 (2015) (“In 2014, the Firm spent more
than $250 million, and had approximately 1,000 people focused on cybersecurity efforts, and these efforts are
expected to grow significantly over the coming years.”).
301 See, e.g., Daniel Huang, Emily Glazer & Danny Yadron, Financial Firms Bolster Cybersecurity
Budgets, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 17, 2014, 1:05 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/financial-firms-bolstercybersecurity-budgets-1416182536 [https://perma.cc/EGP8-8H79]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Matthew
Goldstein, After JPMorgan Chase Breach, Push to Close Wall St. Security Gaps, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2014,
4:57 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/10/21/after-jpmorgan-cyberattack-a-push-to-fortify-wall-streetbanks/ [https://perma.cc/AD47-MF2A].
302 See DON TAPSCOTT & ALEX TAPSCOTT, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTION: HOW THE TECHNOLOGY BEHIND
BITCOIN IS CHANGING MONEY, BUSINESS, AND THE WORLD 39–41 (2016) (discussing the security benefits of
blockchain technology for financial firms).
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The federal government could utilize various policy tools to incentivize
private financial firms to improve their cybersecurity in a more proactive
manner.303 Tax law, for instance, if properly calibrated, can encourage
institutions in the financial industry to enhance their cyber defenses in a timely
manner. Through a combination of tax credits, bonus depreciation, and increased
deductions, policymakers can incentivize the replacement of outdated,
vulnerable information systems and a greater investment in better, more secure
systems.304 Following the recent financial crisis, policymakers used similar tax
policies to stimulate private businesses towards accelerating and enlarging
capital investments to help jumpstart economic activity.305 Furthermore, in
addition to the tools of tax policy, the federal government can also use its large
procurement powers to enhance financial cybersecurity and guard against
market manipulation.306 For instance, the federal government can drastically
improve financial cybersecurity by expressing contracting preferences for
financial institutions that meet certain cybersecurity benchmarks, which would
be continually monitored and updated over time.307 As one of the world’s largest
purchasers of goods and services, the federal government’s contracting
preferences could lead to significant cybersecurity improvements at key
financial firms and generally in the financial marketplace.308 It should be noted
that the federal government already imposes certain cybersecurity requirements
for many of its vendors, but it can certainly do more to enhance its cybersecurity
requirements to reflect the latest threats in the marketplace.309
In sum, the need for better and more vigilant financial cybersecurity will be
one of the key implications of cybernetic market manipulation. Policymakers
303

Derek E. Bambauer, Schrödinger’s Cybersecurity, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 791, 848–50 (2015).
See, e.g., GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31852, THE SECTION 179 AND BONUS
DEPRECIATION EXPENSING ALLOWANCES: CURRENT LAW AND ISSUES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS (2015),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31852.pdf; JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43432, BONUS
DEPRECIATION: ECONOMIC AND BUDGETARY ISSUES (2014), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43432.pdf; INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., PUB. No. 946, HOW TO DEPRECIATE PROPERTY 3–24 (2013); James M. Williamson & John L.
Pender, Economic Stimulus and the Tax Code: The Impact of the Gulf Opportunity Zone, 44 PUB. FIN. REV. 415
(2014).
305 See Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242, 3040 (2015); Tax
Increase Prevention Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-295, 128 Stat. 4010 (2014).
306 See, e.g., Daniel P. Gitterman, The American Presidency and the Power of the Purchaser, 43
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 225, 225–29 (2013).
307 See Bambauer, supra note 303, at 1062–63.
308 See id.; Gitterman, supra note 306, at 225–29.
309 See Implementation of Information Technology Security Provision, 77 Fed. Reg. 749, 750–51 (Jan. 6,
2012) (codified at 48 C.F.R. pts. 501, 539, 552); Improving Cybersecurity Protections in Federal Acquisitions,
OFF. FED. CHIEF INFO. OFFICER, https://policy.cio.gov/cybersecurity-protections-in-federal-acquisitions/ (last
visited Mar. 17, 2017).
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and regulators must thoughtfully and creatively use various tools at their
disposal to encourage private firms to take a more proactive and timely posture
to improve financial cybersecurity so as to guard against the emerging threats of
cybernetic market manipulation.
C. Investment Strategies
A key implication of the emergence of the new modes of market
manipulation could likely be a significant withdrawal of ordinary investors from
a marketplace they perceive to be rigged and manipulated to privilege other
types of investors in the marketplace.310 Flash Boys, the Flash Crash, and other
recent market events have dispelled any notion that the stock market is a stable,
level playing field for all investors. Its message runs contrary to the
pronouncements and intimations of regulators over the years. 311 Polling and
commentary in recent years have suggested that confidence in the fairness of
equity markets among Americans has dropped significantly.312 Nevertheless,
ordinary investors still make up a significant faction of the investor
population.313
Instead of withdrawing from directly investing in the marketplace entirely,
ordinary investors seeking better returns should adopt a boring, low-cost, lowspeed investment strategy in the new high-tech, high-speed financial
marketplace.314 To best maximize their long-term returns in this turbulent, hightech marketplace, ordinary investors should invest via low-fee index funds,
exchange-traded funds, or mutual funds that track the broad marketplace. This
straightforward investment advice is not novel or original; famed investors like
John Bogle, Warren Buffett, and Burton Malkiel have been advocating this
310 See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461 (2015) (surveying the various
types of investors in the marketplace).
311 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, Securities Act Release No. 33-7881, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715,
51,715 (Aug. 24, 2000) (suggesting that all investors should be on a “level playing field with market insiders”);
Hu, supra note 52, at 840–42 (discussing how the SEC encourages investments in the stock market); Donald C.
Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L. REV.
1025, 1026 (2009) (discussing regulatory efforts to “level the playing field between the meek and the
privileged”); Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 272–75 (2008).
312 Fox, Glosten & Rauterberg, supra note 7, at 194.
313 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
2012, at 746 t.1201 (131st ed. 2012), http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/statab/
131ed/2012-statab.pdf; Alicia Davis Evans, A Requiem for the Retail Investor, 95 VA. L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2009)
(“[R]etail investor market participation, though declining relative to that of institutions, is growing on an absolute
basis.”).
314 RICHARD FERRI, THE POWER OF PASSIVE INVESTING: MORE WEALTH WITH LESS WORK, at x–xviii
(2011).
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approach for years.315 Fortunately, in recent years, more and more investors have
been moving their money into passive funds.316 Nevertheless, though it may
seem straightforward and simple, many ordinary investors still lose billions of
dollars each year trying to beat the market. The emergence of new modes of
market manipulation may make it even harder for ordinary investors to directly
compete in the market on a short-term, hour-to-hour or day-to-day basis.
Even in the absence of traditional and new forms of market manipulation,
there exists a significant discord between the myth and the reality of the financial
marketplace that paints a very unfavorable outlook for ordinary investors. In
theory, every investor has the same opportunity to compete for positive returns
in a well-regulated, efficient, and fair marketplace.317 This is because in the
theoretical realm of efficient capital markets, there are no meaningful
differences between ordinary investors and more sophisticated investors like the
high-frequency traders, since everyone is equally rational and capable.318 In
reality, ordinary investors can be incredibly unskilled and obtuse when
compared to sophisticated investors like high-frequency traders.319 Furthermore,
even if ordinary investors were as skilled and informed as their sophisticated
counterparts, the sophisticated investors with better resources would be able to
execute their trades faster than ordinary investors.320 As such, ordinary investors
trading from their laptops should not reasonably expect to compete with
investors that have better technology and better information. Numerous studies

315

See, e.g., BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE TIME-TESTED STRATEGY
SUCCESSFUL INVESTING 399–401 (2012); Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Bd., Berkshire
Hathaway Inc., to Berkshire Hathaway Shareholders 23–25 (Feb. 25, 2017), http://www.berkshirehathaway.
com/letters/2016ltr.pdf.
316 Sarah Krouse et al., Why Passive Investing Is Overrunning Active, in Five Charts, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 17,
2016, 10:30 AM), http://www.wsj.com/graphics/passive-investing-five-charts/?mod=wsjapp [https://perma.cc/
7N6L-HK6N].
317 See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama & James D. MacBeth, Long-Term Growth in a Short-Term Market, 29 J. FIN.
857, 859 & n.7 (1974) (positing that investors theoretically have “homogenous expectations”).
318 See, e.g., Merton H. Miller, The History of Finance, 25 J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Summer 1999, at 95, 97
(explaining modern portfolio theory’s presumption that “investors all share the same expectations as to returns,
variances, and covariances”).
319 See Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution
Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79 (2001) (finding poor investment practices by ordinary investors); Jill E.
Fisch & Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes? An Experiment on Mutual Fund
Choice, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 605, 606 (2014) (“Mounting evidence demonstrates that retail investors make
predictable, costly mistakes.”).
320 See Fabozzi, Focardi & Jonas, supra note 104, at 10 (highlighting the advantages of faster execution
speed in the marketplace); Matthew Baron, Jonathan Brogaard & Andrei Kirilenko, The Trading Profits of High
Frequency Traders (Nov. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), conference.nber.org/confer//2012/MMf12/
Baron_Brogaard_Kirilenko.pdf.
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suggest that ordinary investors should not be trying to pick winners and losers
in the stock market.321 Simply put, ordinary investors should not expect
extraordinary returns from the marketplace.
Graphically, based on a chart from the prominent investment management
firm BlackRock, the dismal long-term returns of actively managed investments
by ordinary investors relative to other investment strategies focused on stocks,
bonds, gold, international stocks, homes, oil, and inflation is quite stark322:
Table 1: Returns of Average Investors Relative to Other Asset Classes (1996–
2015)

Rather than using short-term strategies, ordinary investors should adopt a
passive, long-term, low-cost investment strategy. To maximize their long-term
returns, investors should invest in low-fee index funds and mutual funds that
track the broad marketplace using benchmarks like the S&P 500 and the Russell
2000 indexes.323 Modern portfolio theory suggests that market-wide
diversification along with low transaction fees would permit investors to reduce
their risk exposure and maximize the benefits of compounding returns over the

321 See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock
Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 785–88 (2000); Andrea Frazzini & Owen A.
Lamont, Dumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 299, 319
(2008) (“[I]ndividual investors have a striking ability to do the wrong thing.”); Ronald C. Lease, Wilbur G.
Lewellen & Gary G. Schlarbaum, The Individual Investor: Attributes and Attitudes, 29 J. FIN. 413, 429–31
(1974); Don A. Moore et al., Positive Illusions and Forecasting Errors in Mutual Fund Investment Decisions,
79 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 95, 110–12 (1999); Felix Salmon, Stop Selling Bonds to Retail
Investors, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 837, 837 (2004).
322 Investing and Emotions, How the Average Investor Stacks Up, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.
com/investing/literature/investor-education/investing-and-emotions-one-pager-va-us.pdf (last visited Sept. 11,
2016).
323 See, e.g., JOHN C. BOGLE, THE LITTLE BOOK OF COMMON SENSE INVESTING: THE ONLY WAY TO
GUARANTEE YOUR FAIR SHARE OF STOCK MARKET RETURNS 45–53 (2007).
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long term.324 In fact, ample evidence over the years indicates this passive
approach is the method most likely to generate the best returns for most investors
over a long-term period measured in years and decades, not hours and days.325
Investing is not necessarily an endeavor that rewards the swiftest and most active
participant. The good-tempered and patient investor frequently does well over
the long run. Furthermore, as more cybernetic market manipulation methods
emerge to facilitate short-term marketplace distortions, a long-term passive
approach is immune from such short-term manipulations. A long-term, passive
investor has little to fear of pinging, spoofing, wash trading, or mass
misinformation since those short-term manipulations generally do little or
nothing to the long run valuation of a company.326 It is important to note that a
wholesale shift of capital from most investors in the marketplace to passive
funds could have profound implications on market dynamics and corporate
governance.327 That said, until those implications manifest and prove to be
deleterious to investors, this recommendation remains sage advice for most
ordinary investors.
In sum, the emergence of new cybernetic modes of market manipulation may
discourage many ordinary investors from directly participating in a marketplace
that they perceived to be rigged against them. Instead of withdrawing entirely
from directly investing in the marketplace, more ordinary investors should adopt
a boring, low-cost, passive investment strategy that favors sustainable long-term
value over quick short-term gains, as many of their peers have already begun to
do so.

324 See IAN AYRES & BARRY NALEBUFF, LIFECYCLE INVESTING: A NEW, SAFE, AND AUDACIOUS WAY TO
IMPROVE THE PERFORMANCE OF YOUR RETIREMENT PORTFOLIO 1–3 (2010) (highlighting the importance of
investment diversification); Nicolas P.B. Bollen & Jeffrey A. Busse, Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund
Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569, 594–95 (2005) (advocating for “a naive buy-and-hold approach”); Edwin
J. Elton & Martin J. Gruber, Modern Portfolio Theory, 1950 to Date, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 1743, 1744 (1997);
Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 87–91 (1952); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Can We Do Better by
Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 480–82 (2014) (discussing how index funds and mutual funds can protect ordinary
investors).
325 See LARRY E. SWEDROE, KEVIN GROGAN & TIYA LIM, THE ONLY GUIDE YOU’LL EVER NEED FOR THE
RIGHT FINANCIAL PLAN: MANAGING YOUR WEALTH, RISK, AND INVESTMENTS 82–93 (2010) (summarizing
evidence supporting passive investing); Ben Hall, The Importance of Asset Allocation and ETFs, 4 J. INDEX
INVESTING 24 (2013); Burton G. Malkiel, Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991, 50 J.
FIN. 549 (1995).
326 See BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR: A BOOK OF PRACTICAL COUNSEL 477 (2006).
327 Sarah Krouse, David Benoit & Tom McGinty, Meet the New Corporate Power Brokers: Passive
Investors, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2016, 10:41 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-new-corporate-powerbrokers-passive-investors-1477320101 [https://perma.cc/YST8-4YDH].
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CONCLUSION
In a rapidly evolving financial marketplace, the new methods of cybernetic
market manipulation will pose some of the most vexing challenges for
policymakers and regulators in the coming years. The emergence of market
manipulation methods that leverage new financial technology, electronic
communications, and information systems to unfairly privilege the few at the
expense of the many will threaten the very integrity and credibility of our
financial markets. Every investor and institution could be at risk of suffering
direct and indirect losses.
This Article identifies and explores the forthcoming challenges posed by the
new financial marketplace and the emerging efforts to manipulate it. It offers an
original examination of the new forms of market distortions that it terms
cybernetic market manipulation, explains the potential damage of these
disruptive actions on the marketplace, and recommends pragmatic policies to
better protect investors and safeguard financial markets from manipulation.
Throughout its analysis, this Article is aware of the demands of regulating a
rapidly evolving financial marketplace, but it is also mindful of the need for
swift and thoughtful action against the looming threats to distort the
marketplace. In the end, this Article hopes to serve as an early, working
framework for thinking and acting with urgency about our new financial reality
and the new market manipulation.

